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Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers 
Jurisprudence 
Aziz Z. Huq† 
This Article identifies and analyzes the recent emergence of a “tiers of scruti-
ny” system in Supreme Court jurisprudence respecting the boundaries of Con-
gress’s enumerated powers. The inquiry is motivated by the Court’s recent ruling 
on the federal healthcare law, which demonstrated that the national legislature’s 
election among its diverse textual sources of authority in Article I can have large, 
outcome-determinative consequences in constitutional challenges to federal laws. 
This is so because the Court not only delineates each power’s substantive bounda-
ries differently but also applies distinct standards of review to the various legisla-
tive powers enumerated in Article I and elsewhere in the Constitution. Variation in 
the standard of review generates both synchronic and diachronic oscillation in the 
quantum of empirical justification and means-end rationality demanded of Con-
gress. This observed heterogeneity in the judicial demand for legislative rationality 
and empirical evidence is quite distinct from questions of how broadly or narrowly 
the substance of each enumerated power is defined.  
This Article’s threshold contribution is a comprehensive documentation of 
variation in doctrinal formulae concerning the standard of review in enumerated 
powers cases. Having demonstrated the existence of tiers of scrutiny for enumerat-
ed powers, it then evaluates their use in enumerated powers jurisprudence. Draw-
ing on political science scholarship, social choice theory, and public choice theory, 
it demonstrates that the Court’s use of tiers of scrutiny has deleterious effects on 
judicial and legislative incentives and behavior. This Article then identifies six po-
tential justifications for the Court’s emergent practice of calibrating judicial review 
differentially by enumerated power. Closely examining each of those six justifica-
tions for stratified review, it finds all of them wanting. At the same time as it cre-
ates negative externalities, therefore, the practice of tiered review for enumerated 
powers lacks any compelling normative justification. By abandoning the emerging 
tiers of scrutiny and instead employing a lockstep approach to the review of enu-
merated powers, this Article suggests, federal courts would reduce opportunities for 
strategic behavior by judges and elected officials. The proposed doctrinal reformu-
lation would also introduce clarity into a currently opaque, yet abidingly im-
portant, domain of public law. 
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. My thanks to 
Daniel Abebe and Brian Galle for helpful and incisive comments on early drafts. I am 
further grateful to Mishan Wroe for her aid in preparing this Article. In addition, I am 
deeply indebted to Remi Paul Korenblit, Brad Hubbard, Garett Rose, and the other edi-
tors of The University of Chicago Law Review for their patient, diligent, and insightful 
work improving the text of this Article. I am pleased to acknowledge the support of the 
Frank Cicero Jr Faculty Fund. All mistakes are mine alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than two centuries after the Constitution’s ratifica-
tion, questions persist about how federal courts should superin-
tend Congress’s diverse and heterogeneous enumerated powers.1 
In the October Term 2011 alone, the Supreme Court issued divid-
ed opinions about the Commerce Clause, the Taxing Power, and 
the Spending Power (all in one landmark judgment concerning 
 
 1 For an example of Congress’s diverse enumerated powers, see US Const Art I, § 8 
(enumerating regulatory powers, including the Taxing Power and the power to regulate 
interstate and foreign commerce); US Const Art IV, §§ 1, 3–4 (granting authority to regu-
late interstate relations, territories, and to protect states against invasion and domestic 
violence); US Const Amends XIII § 2, XIV § 5, XV § 2 (granting Congress authority to 
enact legislation with respect to three post–Civil War Amendments); US Const Amend 
XVI (granting power to levy and collect taxes); US Const Amends XIX, XXIII § 2, XXIV 
§ 2, XXVI § 2 (granting power to enforce various voting rights). 
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the 2010 federal healthcare law),2 about § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,3 and about the Copyright Clause.4 In each case, the 
Court divided not only on how to draw substantive boundaries 
on federal power but also on the methodological question of the 
appropriate standard of review. The Justices, that is, disagreed 
not only about outcomes but also about the scope and nature of 
the deference owed to Congress’s empirical and policy judgments.  
Out of these methodological fractures has emerged a system 
of de facto “tiers of scrutiny” for the enumerated powers. Federal 
legislators’ election among their distinct sources of constitution-
al authority enumerated in Article I and elsewhere in the Con-
stitution consequently yields divergent species of judicial scruti-
ny characterized by more or less intense attention to the factual 
foundations and means-ends rationality of a federal legislative 
enactment.5 
Judicial recourse to a tiered system for constitutional review 
is, of course, familiar to legal scholars from the fundamental 
rights and equal protection contexts. In those jurisprudential 
domains, the Court’s taxonomies of constitutional challenges—
each typically organized around either two or three tiers of re-
view—facilitate adjudication by providing off-the-rack decision 
rules.6 By establishing stable and predictable definitions of liti-
gants’ burdens of persuasion and production, judicial employment 
of tiers of scrutiny lowers decision costs and expedites litigation. 
 
 2 See generally National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 
2566 (2012) (“The Healthcare Cases”). 
 3 See Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S Ct 1327, 1333–35 (2012). 
 4 See Golan v Holder, 132 S Ct 873, 878 (2012). Another important enumerated 
power, which happened not to be considered in October Term 2011, derives from the 
Naturalization Clause. Congressional power respecting not just naturalization but im-
migration more generally has been characterized in sweeping terms. See, for example, 
Galvan v Press, 347 US 522, 530–32 (1954); Harisiades v Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 587, 
591 (1952).  
 5 Consider Robert C. Post, Congress & the Court: The Scope of National Legislative 
Power, 137 Daedalus 81, 81–82 (Fall 2008) (“The Court [has] struck down national legis-
lation on the ground that Congress had failed to compile a sufficiently detailed and con-
vincing record to justify encroachment on the sphere of state sovereignty.”). 
 6 The literature on tiers of scrutiny is too extensive to catalogue. For an excellent 
(and skeptical) discussion in the equal protection context, see generally Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Equality without Tiers, 77 S Cal L Rev 481 (2004). See also Michael Klarman, 
An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich L Rev 213, 214–19 (1991) 
(charting the history of standards of scrutiny). For a similar discussion in the First 
Amendment context, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate 
Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U Ill L Rev 783, 787 (illustrating “the 
adoption of the formal standards of review developed in the equal protection arena . . . 
into the edifice of First Amendment law”). 
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But even fleeting familiarity with that jurisprudence reveals 
how important the Court’s election of a tier of review can be. In-
deed, it is practically a truism that the justices’ threshold deci-
sions about how to allocate constitutional rights disputes among 
tiers can have and do have a large, perhaps outcome-dispositive, 
significance in many strands of individual rights adjudication.7  
Similarly, the Court’s choice among tiers can determine the 
fate of a federal law in the enumerated powers context. Some 
Justices have already noted that the Court’s election of a stand-
ard of review has been outcome dispositive in recent Commerce 
Clause8 and Fourteenth Amendment litigation.9 Commentators 
have made a parallel observation respecting litigation pursuant 
to the Spending Power.10 Tiers of scrutiny for the enumerated 
powers, like their kindred in the fundamental rights and equal 
protection jurisprudence, may be refractory doctrinal minutiae. 
But they can also be intricacies of grave national consequence.  
Despite its importance, the Court’s recent deployment of ti-
ers of scrutiny as a tool in evaluating Congress’s deployment of 
enumerated powers has elicited little scholarly comment or 
 
 7 Even if higher tiers of scrutiny are not always “fatal in fact,” they exercise a 
powerful influence in speech and equality cases. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 
1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court; A Model for 
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8 (1972); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory 
and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 
Vand L Rev 793, 796–97 (2006) (finding that nearly one-in-three laws survive strict scru-
tiny challenges, but that survival rates vary according to the right at issue). 
 8 Compare United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 567 (1995) (Rehnquist) (refusing to 
“pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States”), with id at 603 (Souter dissenting) (“In reviewing congressional legislation 
under the Commerce Clause, we defer to what is often a merely implicit congressional 
judgment that its regulation addresses a subject substantially affecting interstate com-
merce ‘if there is any rational basis for such a finding.’”). 
 9 Compare Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 
370 (2001) (Rehnquist) (finding that “Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of 
unconstitutional state discrimination” that it failed to establish the evidentiary predicate 
for constitutional action), with id at 376 (Breyer dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
“[r]eviewing the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency record”). See 
also Post, 137 Daedalus at 81–82 (cited in note 5). 
 10 See Lynn A. Baker and Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court 
Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke 
It to Do So, 78 Ind L J 459, 460 (2003) (“[M]any commentators . . . have proposed that 
Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights decisions by using the 
spending power to circumvent those limitations on congressional power.”). See also Rich-
ard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 
89 Cornell L Rev 1, 32–33 (2003); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after 
Lopez, 95 Colum L Rev 1911, 1916, 1962–66 (1995); Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Fried-
man, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 1988 S Ct Rev 85, 125–26. 
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analysis. Most studies of congressional power linger rather on 
“high” theory matters of interpretive methodology, asking what 
hermeneutic tools—text, original semantic meaning, conse-
quences, post–enactment practice—should be invoked when in-
terpreting a given enumerated power.11 Questions of “law declara-
tion,” that is, the judicial elaboration of “legal rules, standards, 
and principles . . . that [ ] yield[] a proposition that is general in 
character,”12 dominate this debate, casting into shadow technical 
but highly consequential matters about how factual questions 
are evaluated, what kind of means-ends rationality is demand-
ed, and how legal standards are applied to legislative records. 
No doubt deep questions of constitutional first principles matter. 
But scaling the commanding heights avails little if one fails to 
grasp the tactical dynamics of the litigation quagmire.  
To remedy that gap in the legal scholarship, this Article an-
alyzes and evaluates the emergent tiers of scrutiny system in 
enumerated powers doctrine. My first ambition is simple and 
descriptive. I aim to show how standards of review have varied 
both diachronically across time and synchronically among dif-
ferent grants of congressional authority. Invocation of some 
enumerated powers now triggers scrutiny that, if not “strict,” 
then approaches that lofty rank.13 By contrast, other enumerat-
ed powers elicit milder, less exigent forms of judicial attention.14 
This analysis casts light on one important modality of legal 
change: by recalibrating the standard of review—and thereby al-
tering Congress’s evidentiary burden of production—the Court 
can either enlarge or diminish the scope of legislative discretion 
without changing the verbal formulation of a power’s substan-
tive scope. 
 
 11 In 1982, Professor Philip Bobbitt developed a typology of constitutional argu-
ments that remains useful today. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 7–23, 93–94 
(Oxford 1982). For examples of fine recent scholarship that engages in this kind of inter-
pretive exercise respecting particular clauses, see generally Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intel-
lectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 Duke L J 1329 (2012); Jack M. Balkin, 
Commerce, 109 Mich L Rev 1 (2011). 
 12 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum L Rev 229, 234–35 (1985). 
 13 Strict scrutiny, despite its reputed rigor, is more internally variegated, and on 
occasion amounts to “little more than weighted balancing, with the scales tipped slightly 
to favor the protected right.” Richard H. Fallon Jr, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L 
Rev 1267, 1271 (2007). Construed in that fashion, it is not so different from the treat-
ment of some enumerated powers. 
 14 Compare South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 207 (1987) (deferring substantially to 
Congress’s judgment when reviewing a regulation governed by the Spending Power and 
upholding the law as constitutional), with Lopez, 514 US at 559, 567–68. 
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My second goal is to evaluate the new tiers of scrutiny for 
enumerated powers as a device for attaining constitutional 
goals.15 Despite compelling arguments against viewing constitu-
tional provisions “in splendid isolation,”16 there is to date no 
synoptic analysis of whether the standard of review used by fed-
eral courts should vary by enumerated power. In the late 1990s, 
to be sure, some scholars developed critiques of the Court’s 
treatment of legislative facts pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17 While illuminating, these treatments were 
pitched narrowly: They were largely condemnations of the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism swerve. As the Court continues to 
flesh out the tiers of scrutiny for enumerated powers, the time is 
ripe for a more comprehensive and dispassionate analysis of the 
discontinuous forms of judicial scrutiny used to temper Con-
gress’s powers.  
To that end, I consider whether there is a compelling justifi-
cation for tiered review based on the constitutional text, original 
meaning, individual rights, federalism, or political process pa-
thologies. In pursuing this inquiry, I assume that the aim of ju-
dicial doctrine is to promote a bundle of normatively desirable 
constitutional “goods.” These goods might be taken to include, for 
example, social welfare, the promotion of democratic values, and 
the elimination of strategic or self-dealing behavior by political or 
 
 15 Several useful pieces have been written on the more general question of how the 
Court instantiates general constitutional norms in the context of specific cases. For the 
best example, see Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Im-
plementing the Constitution, 111 Harv L Rev 54, 67–73 (1997) (cataloging eight species of 
doctrinal tests in constitutional law).  
 16 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv L Rev 747, 788 (1999) (generally 
arguing against clause-bound methods of interpreting the Constitution). 
 17 For the most important pieces in this largely critical literature that I draw upon 
in what follows, see generally Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitu-
tion from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind L J 1 (2003); 
Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943 (2003); 
Philip P. Frickey and Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and 
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Yale L J 1707 (2002); William 
W. Buzbee and Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan L Rev 87 (2001); 
A. Christopher Bryant and Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme 
Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L Rev 
328 (2001); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Pow-
ers, 53 Stan L Rev 1127 (2001); Ruth Colker and James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 
100 Mich L Rev 80 (2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Ju-
dicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 Duke L J 1169 (2001); Robert C. Post and Reva 
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morri-
son and Kimel, 110 Yale L J 441 (2000). 
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judicial elites.18 Based on that normative analysis, I conclude 
that there is no positive justification for currently observed vari-
ance in standards of review.  
I instead find that varying the intensity of judicial review 
among enumerated powers has negative externalities in an im-
portant subset of cases. Instead of current arrangements, I sug-
gest, judicial review should move in lockstep for all of Congress’s 
enumerated powers. There ought, in other words, to be no tiers 
of scrutiny in enumerated powers jurisprudence. 
My analysis and proposed reform are narrowly calibrated 
along two dimensions. First, I make no assumption about the 
appropriate general theory of judicial review or the correct insti-
tutional allocation of constitutional interpretive authority.19 It is 
sufficient for my purposes to say that the Constitution seems to 
vest national political institutions with incentives that conduce 
to some delegation—but not complete abdication—of interpre-
tive responsibility to the federal courts.20 The result has been a 
network of “weak departmentalist” practices by which the au-
thority to determine the constitutionality of statutes or execu-
tive actions is shared between courts and political actors.21 My 
 
 18 I am cognizant of the fact that the quantum of democratic decision making in 
political systems with a written constitution is not self-evident. I also recognize that de-
sign margins sometimes associated with democracy, such as transparency, can have per-
verse effects. See Adrian Vermeule, Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ 
Small 183–215 (Oxford 2007). The argument developed here, however, touches upon nei-
ther of those important constraints on the instantiation of democratic values.  
 19 It is no great simplification to say that the relevant literature here proceeds by 
either agreeing with or objecting to the deservedly canonical article by Professor James 
B. Thayer at the turn of the twentieth century that synoptically laid out the basis for 
judicial deference to the political branches. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of 
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129, 144 (1893) (“It can only 
disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a 
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational ques-
tion.”). For divergent evaluations of Thayer’s foundational thesis, compare Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum L Rev 1, 8 (1983) (labeling 
Professor Thayer’s formula for judicial invalidation “too simplistic” for the elaborate body 
of modern constitutional doctrine), with F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption 
of Constitutionality, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 1447, 1458–62 (2010) (rejecting arguments 
against Thayerian deference and suggesting that adopting a scheme of Thayerian defer-
ence is preferable). 
 20 For a presentation of a similar view, see Mark Tushnet, Why the Constitution 
Matters 126–32 (Yale 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s one of the institutions [national poli-
ticians] can pass the issues off to, at least if you can give the issue a constitutional 
spin.”). See also Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 
Va L Rev 1001, 1062 (2012). 
 21 See Huq, 98 Va L Rev at 1010, 1034–37 (cited in note 20) (defining “weak de-
partmentalism” as a situation where each of the three branches of federal government 
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aim here is to isolate and analyze one specific, yet consequential 
question—the appropriate standard of judicial review—within 
that complex network. I do not aim to elaborate here a full ac-
count of the entire system. 
Second, I advance here a relatively narrow point about the 
doctrine: that judicial review of the enumerated powers should 
move in lockstep. But—and this is the important qualification—
I make no claim about whether constraints on federal legislative 
power can or should be strong or weak. That is, I do not mean to 
resolve the question whether the federal government should be 
subject to across-the-board, exacting limitations to preserve fed-
eralism values and individual rights, or whether it should be 
given more leeway. The appropriate scope of federal power is a 
large, controversial question. Judges and commentators have 
weighed in on both sides from the dawn of the Republic onward, 
with results that fill libraries with distemper and hyperbole. No 
one new law review article can decide what boundaries are ap-
propriately limned to circumscribe federal legislative power. It 
would be hubris to attempt as much, and I do not do so. 
It also bears emphasis that the argument developed here 
takes doctrine as a meaningful unit of analysis. That is, I do not 
view doctrine as a wholly epiphenomenal consequence of exoge-
nous political developments.22 I further assume that judge and 
lawyer participants in American constitutional development ac-
cept the intellectual framework of legal doctrine with all its 
aporia and ambiguities. Role fidelity and the normative tug of 
legality as a public good, in my view, ensure that doctrine has 
some marginal effect beyond the brute force of political facts.23 
Consequently, I believe there is value in working toward integrity 
                                                                                                             
engages in independent constitutional interpretation on some matters but defers to the 
constitutional judgment of the other branches on others). 
 22 I have elsewhere analyzed the development of judicial review from an external 
perspective attentive to political economy trends. See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial 
Self-Restraint?, 100 Cal L Rev 579, 583 (2012). The relation between this external per-
spective and the “internal” perspective of doctrinal analysis is a complex matter since 
doctrine clearly accounts for facts exogenous to the law, but loses its integrity entirely if 
reduced entirely to such facts. My limited claim here is doctrine is an appropriate object of 
scholarly inquiry—and not that it is exhaustive of the determinants of judicial outcomes.  
 23 Writing last year in these pages, I argued that “law and politics do not operate as 
substitutes in the regulation of executive authority” but “instead work as interlocking 
complements.” Aziz Z. Huq, Book Review, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 
79 U Chi L Rev 777, 783 (2012). The same, I think, holds for judges. Indeed, it is likely 
that judges are even more sensitive to the formal demands of law than presidents. Un-
less one concludes that doctrine is purely a charade, in short, there remains value in doc-
trinal investigation. 
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and coherence in the doctrine quite apart from any analysis of 
the political economy of judicial review. 
In brief then, my aim here is to strip away a layer of unnec-
essary complexity so as to render the current doctrinal frame-
work pellucid and then critique the jurisprudential mechanisms 
used to make fundamental choices between weak and strong 
federal authority. If the Court were to adopt the reform proposed 
here, and switch to a unitary standard of review across enumer-
ated powers, I believe that the Justices would no longer be able 
to obfuscate or occlude important first-order questions of how 
broadly federal authority should sweep. In lieu of decisions with 
greater symbolic than practical freight, the Court would have to 
take a clear position on the federal-state balance, as well as the 
limits of its own role in constitutional interpretation. To discard 
tiers of scrutiny in the fashion that I endorse here is, in other 
words, to eliminate a potent font of judicial evasion. It is further 
to move practical resolution of the quandary of federal-state re-
lations into crisper focus in order to promote effectual public de-
bate and dialogue. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I catalogs the ex-
tensive heterogeneity in standards of review respecting the 
enumerated powers. In so doing, I err on the side of comprehen-
siveness. Part II then documents two deleterious consequences 
of tiers of scrutiny in enumerated powers jurisprudence. Those 
observations motivate a further inquiry into potential justifica-
tions for the application of a tiered structure of judicial review. 
Part III articulates and considers six potential justifications for 
tiers of scrutiny as a judicial tool for liquidating the metes and 
bounds of enumerated powers. It finds all of those justifications 
flawed. Together, Parts II and III make a case for an alternative 
lockstep approach to the judicial superintendence of federal leg-
islative authority, wherein the standard of review does not vary 
by enumerated power. 
I.  STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 
SUPERVISION OF ENUMERATED POWERS 
This Part documents the central role standards of review 
play in enumerated powers jurisprudence. Because the Court does 
not always cogently distinguish first-order substantive rules from 
second-order rules allocating epistemic responsibility between 
courts and Congress, it is necessary to work power-by-power to 
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isolate the work done by the standard of review in respect to the 
judicial definition of an enumerated power.  
I focus here on endogenous constraints on the enumerated 
powers—that is, I am not concerned with restraints that emerge 
from other parts of the Constitution, such as its individual 
rights provisions.24 The former constraints, though, are often not 
ends in themselves but part of a strategy to maintain the equi-
librium between federal and state governments.25 Judicial re-
view of the enumerated powers, as a result, is not merely a mat-
ter of glossing specific, narrow texts but often a site for the 
doctrinal elaboration of federalism values.26 
I begin with a definition of my key term—the “standard of 
review”—and then engage in a systematic examination of how 
the Court has calibrated and recalibrated standards of review 
across enumerated powers. 
A. Defining the “Standard of Review” Question 
The assertion that the Court’s “standard of review varies” 
across enumerated powers is not self-explanatory. To be clear 
from the start, I must identify precisely what I mean. By stand-
ard of review, I aim to single out two elements in judicial analy-
sis that, in theory, can be distinguished from the task of declar-
ing a generally applicable rule of law. These two elements are: 
(1) identification of relevant background “legislative facts” upon 
 
 24 The existence of rights-based constraints on federal power was not originally a 
given. We can imagine an alternative constitutional history, in which judges and lawyers 
took seriously Alexander Hamilton’s argument in The Federalist that “bills of rights . . . 
are not only unnecessary . . . but would even be dangerous. They would contain various 
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a col-
orable pretext to claim more than were granted.” Federalist 84 (Hamilton), in The Fed-
eralist 575, 579 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). See also Gordon Wood, The Crea-
tion of the American Republic, 1776–1787 540 (North Carolina 1969) (quoting James 
Wilson to the effect that “[i]t would be very extraordinary to have a bill of rights, because 
the powers of Congress are expressly defined. . . . We retain all those rights which we 
have not given away to the general government”) (second alteration in original). Relying 
on those statements, judges might have read the enumerated powers as limited by natu-
ral law and rights. Of course, that was a path not taken. 
 25 See Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design 99–100 (Cam-
bridge 2009). 
 26 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Compe-
tence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1733, 1748–49 (2005) (“The 
open-textured nature of the Constitution’s structural commitments calls for judicial im-
plementation through doctrine: There is simply no way to administer our federal system 
without developing rules to flesh out the allocation and balance of authority.”). 
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which the invocation of an enumerated power rests27 and (2) 
“norm elaboration,” through which a general rule is applied to 
the specific facts and details of a challenged statute.28 For the 
purpose of this analysis, I treat both elements as distinct from 
“law declaration.”29 I lump both elements under the portmanteau 
term standard of review for the sake of expository parsimony.30 
We can unpack further the idea of a standard of review by 
observing the Court in action in a hypothetical case. The Court’s 
first task in approaching a controversy is to specify a substan-
tive rule of decision.31 Having done so, the justices must then as-
sess the empirical evidence Congress has marshaled to demon-
strate the existence of a problem that can be addressed by an 
enumerated power. They must often also consider the nexus be-
tween a tendered statutory solution and the relevant constitu-
tional power—that is, its means-ends rationality. At this second 
stage, laws might not pass muster either because Congress fails 
to identify a pertinent problem or because the proffered legisla-
tive solution is inadequately tailored to constitutional specifica-
tions.32 Delineating the standard of review, the Court decides 
 
 27 Legislative facts include “general facts about the state of the world that are not 
particularly within the knowledge of the parties with standing to appear before the 
court.” Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfind-
ing, 61 Duke L J 1, 10 (2011). See also David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional 
Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 
U Pa L Rev 541, 552 (1991); Dean Alfange Jr, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Con-
stitutional Law, 114 U Pa L Rev 637, 640 (1966). The seminal account of the varieties of 
legislative fact was developed by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. See Kenneth Culp Da-
vis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 Colum L Rev 931, 932–33 (1980). Consider Kenneth Culp 
Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum L Rev 945, 952–59 (1955); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Ap-
proach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv L Rev 364, 402–
09 (1942). 
 28 Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 235–36 (cited in note 12). Professor Henry P. 
Monaghan uses the terms “[f]act identification” and “[l]aw application” to capture these 
ideas. Id. He is focused, however, on the facts implicated in a given case rather than on 
the factual foundations of a given law. Id at 233 & n 25. Hence, my borrowing of his 
terms involves some deviation from his usage.  
 29 For a similar decomposition of the judicial role in constitutional adjudication, see 
Hessick, 85 Notre Dame L Rev at 1448–49 (cited in note 19) (distinguishing between in-
stances in which “federal courts defer on questions of fact to the legislature” and the 
question whether they “defer on questions of constitutional interpretation”). 
 30 For similar employment of the term, see Devins, 50 Duke L J at 1176 (cited in note 
17) (“Where facts should come into play . . . is in the selection of standards of review.”). 
 31 For a discussion of the various rules of decision available to the Court, see Fal-
lon, 111 Harv L Rev at 67–106 (cited in note 15) (discussing the problem of developing 
doctrinal rules of decisions). 
 32 See, for example, United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 612 (2000) (noting the 
question of how much attenuation to permit between an enumerated power and a statute). 
 586  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:575 
   
whether to impose a demanding or a weak burden of empirical 
production on Congress on both counts. To forego any such bur-
den, however, “would substantially take back the decision to limit 
the legislature with rules enforced in part through the courts.”33 
In decomposing constitutional adjudication into (in essence) 
questions of law and questions of law’s application to fact, I in-
tend to make no deep claim about the fact/law distinction. No 
doubt there are “value judgments implicit in labeling a matter 
one of ‘fact,’”34 such that reasonable people can differ on specific 
applications. No doubt any fact/law distinction may be seen as 
one of degree, not kind.35 And no doubt the Court is not consist-
ently diligent in employing my categories. Nevertheless, the 
fact/law distinction still reflects how judges typically understand 
and carve up constitutional adjudication.36 In that mundane and 
practical sense, it remains a meaningful gesture in our contem-
porary constitutional culture to distinguish disagreements about 
law from disagreements about empirics in most (if not all) in-
stances. So long as the distinction of “legal question[s]” from 
questions of fact remains “a centrally important ordering device 
for allocating and distributing regulative authority among the 
various actors in the legal system,”37 it will be a useful tool for 
dissecting the work of the justices. 
B. Varieties of Judicial Review for Enumerated Powers 
The institution of judicial review predates the 1787 Philadel-
phia Convention.38 It entered the constitutional culture only sotto 
voce. Accounts of the federal courts’ early behavior underscore 
judges’ belief that only “the concededly unconstitutional act” 
 
 33 John Harrison, Book Review, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, 78 U Chi L Rev 1101, 1109 (2011). 
 34 Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court 
Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding under the Post–Civil War Amendments, 59 
Notre Dame L Rev 337, 377 (1984). 
 35 See Monaghan, 85 Colum L Rev at 234–36 (cited in note 12). 
 36 Most famously, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is “convention-
ally understood . . . as requiring independent judicial judgments on questions of law,” but 
not questions of fact. Henry P. Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and 
Related Matters, 112 Colum L Rev 665, 675 (2012). 
 37 Monaghan, 83 Colum L Rev at 4 (cited in note 19). 
 38 See Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 407–61 (Harvard 2008) (collecting 
cases from New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Rhode Island). For anoth-
er account that also traces judicial review back in time beyond the Revolution to “a 
longstanding English corporate practice under which a corporation’s ordinances were 
reviewed for repugnancy to the laws of England,” see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate 
Origins of Judicial Review, 116 Yale L J 503, 504 (2006). 
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could be invalidated.39 Notwithstanding that original under-
standing, other strands of Founding-era thinking can be invoked 
to warrant more aggressive judicial review. Principal among 
these is a concern with federalism.40 From its inception, the Con-
stitution was intended to produce “a multiplicity and interplay 
of interests” from which “the true interest of the entire body of 
the people may shine.”41 Judicial enforcement of constraints on 
federal power was one way to accomplish that goal.42 Consistent 
with this conception of judicial power, the Supreme Court has 
been in the business of speaking to the scope of congressional 
regulatory authority at least since 1824.43 
My aim in what follows is to taxonomize judicial treatment 
of the enumerated powers. I therefore begin with the most liti-
gated of those authorities, the Commerce Clause, before turning 
to the Spending Power, the Taxing Power, the Reconstruction 
Amendments, and the Intellectual Property Clause. To render 
the taxonomy manageable, however, I omit such rara avis of 
federal court contestation as the federal Property Clause44 and 
congressional regulation of interstate compacts.45  
 
 39 Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution 34–35 (Yale 
1990). See also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4, 79 (2001) (claiming that judicial review was originally “a power 
to be employed cautiously, only where the unconstitutionality of a law was clear beyond 
doubt”); William Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships 
of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 227 (South Carolina 1995) (“[T]he fundamental inter-
pretive corollary of judicial review [was that] only legislation that was unconstitutional 
beyond doubt should be declared void.”); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Su-
preme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789–1888 55 (Chicago 1985) (suggesting that a 
“lasting principle[] of construction [was] established before 1801” that “doubtful cases 
were to be resolved in favor of constitutionality”). 
 40 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Fed-
eralism Decisions, 69 U Chi L Rev 429, 439 (2002) (“There is no agreed-upon definition of 
constitutional federalism.”). 
 41 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era 
Police Powers Jurisprudence 32 (Duke 1993). 
 42 See id at 10. 
 43 See Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 239–40 (1824). Gibbons did not involve 
the invalidation of a federal law as ultra vires; rather the Court upheld the relevant fed-
eral regulation of navigation. Id. 
 44 See US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 2 (vesting Congress with “Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property be-
longing to the United States”). For an example of the Court’s unwillingness to regulate 
this power, see Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc, 454 US 464, 466, 485–86 (1982). 
 45 See US Const Art I, § 10, cl 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, 
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.”).  
 588  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:575 
   
Before turning, however, to the Commerce Clause, it is use-
ful to say a word about how the enumerated powers interact 
with an ancillary mechanism at work alongside textual enumer-
ation—the Necessary and Proper Clause.46 The latter has long 
been read to vest Congress with wide discretion in its choice of 
means to achieve constitutionally permissible ends47 (although 
language in one 2012 decision might be read to contract that 
freedom48). For the purpose of this analysis, I take it as given 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause applies uniformly to all 
the enumerated powers following Chief Justice Marshall’s dic-
tum that the clause “does not enlarge” or “restrain” congression-
al power under any particular clause.49 To the extent the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause provides a consistent gloss on Congress’s 
power, however, it cannot explain variation in the standard of 
review among enumerated powers. As a result, it is not useful 
for the purposes of this analysis to break out and separately 
consider a Necessary and Proper component in respect to each 
enumerated power. Instead, I shall discuss each enumerated 
power as it is applied in the trenches, that is, already accounting 
for the potentially resolving and augmenting effects of the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. 
 
 46 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18 (authorizing Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States”).  
 47 See M’Culloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be le-
gitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropri-
ate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and the spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”). The Court recently reaf-
firmed the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See United States v Comstock, 130 
S Ct 1949, 1956 (2010) (“We have since made clear that, in determining whether the 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a partic-
ular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is ra-
tionally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”). See 
also Sabri v United States, 541 US 600, 605 (2004). 
 48 Chief Justice John Roberts used language in his opinion in The Healthcare Cases 
to the effect that the individual mandate was not “proper.” The Healthcare Cases, 132 S 
Ct 2566, 2592 (2012) (Roberts) (“Even if the individual mandate is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s 
insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means.”). This 
application of the Necessary and Proper Clause seems to piggyback on Chief Justice 
Roberts’s Commerce Clause analysis, which focused on the perceived breadth of the fed-
eral government’s claim to regulatory authority. As such it is not clear that it provides a 
new, freestanding constraint on the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id at 2591–92. 
 49 M’Culloch, 17 US at 420. See also Harrison, Book Review, 78 U Chi L Rev at 
1122 (cited in note 33) (finding “good reason to believe that the clause was inserted out of 
caution . . . and confirms what would otherwise be true: a main power brings its inci-
dents with it”). 
 2013] Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence 589 

1. The Commerce Clause. 
Congress’s power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the 
several states”50 has long been pivotal to federal regulation of 
national life. Even at the Founding, such power was perceived 
as central to a federal design wherein “multiple independent 
levels of government could legitimately exist within a single pol-
ity” with a division of authority based on “subject matter.”51 As 
such, disputes over the Commerce Clause have occasioned bit-
ter, ongoing disputes about the scope of the “commerce” amena-
ble to regulation.52 Those disputes have not in the main seemed 
to hinge upon the standard of review.53 But to study the histori-
cal struggle over the Commerce Clause is to perceive that the 
standard of review has been a vital gateway for legal change. 
Near the beginning of the first era of intense debate over the 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court issued a limiting con-
struction of the Sherman Act54 barring the federal government 
from regulating “local” activities such as sugar production.55 
That era closed in 1942 with the Court’s endorsement of federal 
regulation of domestic wheat production.56 Intervening doctrine 
drew key distinctions “between production and commerce and 
between direct and indirect effects on commerce”57—distinctions 
 
 50 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3 (authorizing Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 51 Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 5–6, 66 (Har-
vard 2010).  
 52 For a study in dueling “original” meanings, compare Balkin, 109 Mich L Rev at 
5–6 (cited in note 11) (arguing that “‘commerce’ meant ‘intercourse’ and it had a strongly 
social connotation[]” and hence “was broader than economics narrowly conceived”), with 
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U Chi L Rev 101, 
146 (2001) (advocating a narrower original meaning).  
 53 The first extended Supreme Court discussion of the Commerce Power does not 
address the standard of review question. See Gibbons, 22 US at 194–95. Gibbons was 
more notable as “the beginning of incessant litigation over the extent to which state leg-
islation is precluded by the commerce clause.” Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme 
Court at 173 (cited in note 39). For examples of pre-1900 cases relying on Gibbons, see 
Pensacola Telegraph Co v Western Union Telegraph Co, 96 US 1, 9–11 (1878) (upholding 
congressional power to authorize interstate telegrams); The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 US 
82, 96–98 (1879) (invalidating federal regulation of trademarks as not limited to those in 
interstate or foreign commerce).  
 54 Ch 647, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1–7. 
 55 United States v E. C. Knight Co, 156 US 1, 14–18 (1895). 
 56 Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 119–29 (1942). 
 57 Barry Cushman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, in Michael Grossberg 
and Christopher Tomlines, eds, Cambridge History of Law in America 268, 294 (Cam-
bridge 2008). In that era, the Court also upheld national regulation of local activities on 
the ground that they occurred in the “stream of commerce.” See, for example, Board of 
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both conservative and liberal Justices accepted as late as 1935.58 
Despite routinely invoking a presumption of constitutionality,59 
the Court employed those distinctions to invalidate numerous 
federal laws.60 
My aim here is not an extensive retelling of that well-worn 
story. Rather, my aim here is to flesh out one pivotal mechanism 
of doctrinal change in that period: When the scope of Commerce 
Clause power moved, it was not through rejection of any of the 
aforementioned substantive dichotomies—at least initially. In-
stead, congressional power enlarged when the Court started ap-
plying familiar legal rules with a more deferential standard of 
review. 
The enabling function of the standard of review emerges 
most starkly in rulings on New Deal interventions into the econ-
omy. In an important 1936 dissent from the Court’s opinion 
striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935,61 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo accepted the direct/indirect effects 
line but also emphasized that such “a great principle of constitu-
tional law is not susceptible of comprehensive statement in an 
adjective” and that “considerations of degree” matter.62 Justice 
Cardozo endorsed an approach to “interpret[ation] with sup-
pleness of adaptation and flexibility of meaning” to enable a 
                                                                                                             
Trade of the City of Chicago v Olsen, 262 US 1, 42 (1923) (commodities exchanges); Staf-
ford v Wallace, 258 US 495, 520 (1922) (public stockyards). 
 58 See, for example, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 
546 (1935). It is often forgotten that there were no dissents in Schechter Poultry. Even 
liberal Justices endorsed its formalist categories as part of “a conscious strategy for cir-
cumscribing the boundaries of national and local competence in a principled fashion.” 
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U Chi 
L Rev 1089, 1099 (2000). Rather than sublimated endorsements of untrammeled free 
market ideology, Professor Howard Gillman has argued that these universally shared 
categories “had their roots in principles of political legitimacy that were forged at the 
time of the creation of the Constitution and were later elaborated by state court judges 
as they first addressed the nature and scope of legislative power in the era of Jacksonian 
democracy.” Gillman, Constitution Besieged at 10, 22–60 (cited in note 41).  
 59 For contemporary endorsements of the presumption of constitutionality, see Bor-
den’s Farm Products Co v Baldwin, 293 US 194, 209 (1934) (holding that “if any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain” the challenged legislation, then 
“there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts”); Henry Wolf, Judicial De-
termination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Ac-
tion, 38 Harv L Rev 6, 21 (1924). 
 60 Consider, for example, the cases cited in Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1097–1114 
(cited in note 58). 
 61 Pub L No 74-402, ch 824, 49 Stat 991, repealed by the Bituminous Coal Act of 
1937 § 20(a), Pub L No 75-48, ch 127, 50 Stat 72, 90. 
 62 Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238, 327–28 (1936) (Cardozo dissenting), quot-
ing Schechter Poultry, 295 US at 554. 
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legislative “power . . . as broad as the need that evokes it.”63 In 
so doing, he did not challenge the canonical doctrinal categories, 
but rather suggested they should be applied with “flexibility”—
that is, deference—to accommodate legislative judgments about 
“need.”64  
Within a year, this subtly different perception of doctrinal 
tools migrated into a majority opinion. In 1937, Chief Justice 
Charles Evan Hughes endorsed an expansive construction of the 
National Labor Relations Act65 by explaining that even though 
the regulated “activities may be intrastate in character,” they 
still had “such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect 
that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress could 
not be denied the power to exercise that control.”66  
Without abandoning the direct/indirect line, Chief Justice 
Hughes had introduced the notion that congressional regulation 
of intrastate commerce could be permitted if not “essential” but 
merely “appropriate.”67 By such subtle inflections in the formula-
tions of judicial deference, Chief Justice Hughes weakened the 
requisite nexus between Commerce Clause and statute so as to 
give Congress more play in the regulatory joints.68 
The following year, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone exported 
Chief Justice Hughes’s notion into the economic due process con-
text, where it expanded. Upholding the federal Filled Milk Act of 
1923,69 Justice Stone declared that 
the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is 
to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconsti-
tutional unless in the light of the facts made known or 
 
 63 Carter Coal, 298 US at 328 (Cardozo dissenting). 
 64 Id.  
 65 Pub L No 74-198, ch 372, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC 
§§ 151–69. 
 66 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 37 (1937) (emphasis added). 
Tellingly, Chief Justice Hughes cited Schechter Poultry in support of this proposition, 
showing that Jones & Laughlin did not break from past legal categories. See id at 37, 
citing Schechter Poultry, 295 US at 547. 
 67 Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 37.  
 68 Dissenting in Lopez, Justice David Souter explained that Chief Justice Hughes’s 
opinion in “Jones & Laughlin did not reject the direct-indirect standard in so many 
words; it just said the relation of the regulated subject matter to commerce was direct 
enough. But we know what happened.” United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 615 (1995) 
(Souter dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 69 Pub L No 67-513, ch 262, 42 Stat 1486, codified at 21 USC §§ 61–63. 
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generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude 
the assumption that it rests upon such rational basis within 
the knowledge and experience of the legislators.70 
Justice Stone’s “rational basis” formulation took three years 
to filter back into Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The case, of 
course, was Wickard v Filburn,71 a challenge to the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938.72 Yet Wickard was almost a constitu-
tional nonevent. In his first two drafts of an opinion for the 
Court, Justice Robert Jackson directed a remand to the trial 
court for further factual findings about the nexus between the 
Act and interstate commerce.73 By directing a remand, Justice 
Jackson assumed “empirical verification was essential” for vali-
dation of the Act.74 In the end, instead of remanding, the Court 
set the case for reargument without seeking fresh briefing—a 
move that “foretold the abandonment of a court-centered, empir-
ical methodology in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”75 The 
momentousness of the occasion did not escape the more perspi-
cacious of the Justices. In a contemporaneous memo, Justice 
Jackson observed that “the introduction of economic determin-
ism into constitutional law of interstate commerce marked the 
end of judicial control of the scope of federal activity.”76 Full-
throated deference had finally displaced the formalist dualisms 
of the pre–New Deal era. 
Through these cases, changes to the verbal formulations of 
the Commerce Clause’s substantive metes and bounds played a 
surprisingly secondary role. Instead, the scope of congressional 
power changed first via recalibration of standards of review. The 
nexus between a regulated subject and “interstate” commerce 
became increasingly slack. Judges yielded more and more defer-
ence to Capitol Hill. Traditional categories ultimately deli-
quesced without direct assault. 
 
 70 United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152 (1938) (emphasis added). 
This is the sentence to which the famous Footnote Four was appended. 
 71 317 US 111 (1942). A year earlier, the Court held that “[t]he motive and purpose 
of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the 
exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction.” United States v Darby, 312 US 
100, 115 (1941). That the Court so eschewed invalidation of Commerce Clause enact-
ments on the ground they were pretextual does not mean, however, the Court could not go 
on to exercise some sort of stringent review of Congress’s empirical judgments instead.  
 72 Pub L No 75-430, ch 30, 52 Stat 31, codified as amended at 7 USC § 1281 et seq. 
 73 Cushman, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1137–39 (cited in note 58). 
 74 Id at 1139. 
 75 Id at 1140. 
 76 Id at 1143. 
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Pivoting forward some forty-odd years, standards of review 
again play a motive role in the post-1995 revival of Commerce 
Clause scrutiny. Again, the nexus between a law and interstate 
commerce, as well as the allocation of epistemic labor between 
Congress and the Court, have been central areas of contestation. 
Indeed, it is striking that only one Justice has called for whole-
sale transformation of the substantive limits on Commerce 
Clause power.77 
Today, the doctrinal structure for Commerce Clause dis-
putes revolves around a familiar three-part test: “First, Con-
gress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Second, 
Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in inter-
state commerce. Third, Congress has the power to regulate [in-
trastate] activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”78 
The first two elements of this test attract little judicial at-
tention. By contrast, the Court has developed a reticulated 
structure for examining laws justified by a “substantial” effect 
on interstate commerce. This case law turns on the (hardly pel-
lucid) distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” activi-
ties.79 Whereas substantial-economic-effects-based laws secure 
judicial deference, the Court has subtly shifted the standard of 
review for laws grounded on “noneconomic” substantial effects in 
ways that contract the scope of federal legislative authority. 
 
 77 Lopez, 514 US at 585–602 (Thomas concurring). 
 78 Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 16–17 (2005) (citations omitted), citing Perez v Unit-
ed States, 402 US 146, 150 (1971) and Jones & Laughlin, 301 US at 37. See also Lopez, 
514 US at 561. I emphasize that this is only the core of the doctrinal test. Lopez also 
stated that intrastate activity can be regulated if it is “an essential part of a larger regu-
lation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated.” Id at 561. Depending on how one construes the hold-
ing of The Healthcare Cases, there might now also be an activity/inactivity distinction to 
be drawn respecting intrastate noneconomic activities. Compare The Healthcare Cases, 
132 S Ct at 2589–90 (Roberts) (distinguishing between the regulation of pre-existing 
commerce and commerce yet to exist), with id at 2648–49 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito dissenting) (endorsing a similar distinction). It is not clear how such a distinction 
fits with the balance of the doctrinal test: For example, does it apply to both economic 
and noneconomic activities? Does it limit in any way the first two Lopez prongs? I sus-
pect the short-term impact of the innovation will be small since the federal government 
can often recast inaction as an action.  
 79 Lopez, 514 US at 559–60 (underscoring power to regulate economic activity); id 
at 628–29 (Breyer dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s “distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial activities”). As is oft remarked, the distinction between economic and 
noneconomic activities is not self-explanatory and may ultimately not be coherent. See 
Morrison, 529 US at 656–57 (Breyer dissenting).  
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Just as in the 1930s, the Court in the 1990s seized upon the 
standard of review as an effectual tool to change the scope of 
federal power. Considering federal regulation of guns near 
schools in United States v Lopez,80 Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist conceded that “Congress normally is not required to 
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an ac-
tivity has on interstate commerce.”81 He nonetheless cautioned 
that “congressional findings [ ] enable us to evaluate the legisla-
tive judgment that the activity in question substantially affected 
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was 
visible to the naked eye.”82 Showing this warning to have teeth, 
the Court rejected the government’s proposed nexus between 
school-related violence and interstate commerce because it im-
permissibly “pile[d] inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained 
by the States.”83 Stated otherwise, sufficient means-end rational-
ity was wanting. 
Five years later, United States v Morrison84 confirmed the 
suggestion that the federal government had a greater burden of 
evidentiary production when it sought to regulate “noneconomic” 
matters.85 Morrison rejected an effort to spin inferences from 
gender-based violence to interstate commerce as grounded on a 
“method of reasoning” that was “unworkable if we are to main-
tain the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”86 The Court was 
explicit that “[w]hether particular operations affect interstate 
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of 
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a 
legislative question.”87 Rational basis review, in short, was no 
longer the regime of the day,88 even when Congress had 
amassed what the dissent labeled a “mountain of data” in support 
of the law.89 Rather, the Court would show “deference under 
 
 80 514 US 549 (1995). 
 81 Id at 562 (emphasis added). 
 82 Id at 563. 
 83 Id at 567.  
 84 529 US 598 (2000). 
 85 Id at 613. 
 86 Id at 615. 
 87 Id at 614 (emphasis added), quoting Lopez, 514 US at 557 n 2. 
 88 Morrison, 529 US at 617–20. 
 89 Id at 628 (Souter dissenting) (“The fact of such a substantial effect is not an issue 
for the courts in the first instance, but for the Congress, whose institutional capacity for 
gathering evidence and taking testimony far exceeds our own.”); id at 619–20 (majority). 
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the rationality rule [ ] subject to gradation according to the 
commercial or noncommercial nature of the immediate subject of 
the challenged regulation.”90 
The question of how to calibrate the standard of review 
arose again in the 2012 challenges by states and individuals to 
the individual mandate component of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,91 which were consolidated on certiorari re-
view as National Federation of Independent Business v Sebe-
lius92 (“The Healthcare Cases”). Echoing Lopez and Morrison, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s vote against the mandate’s validity un-
der the Commerce Clause hinged on a refusal to defer to Con-
gress’s empirical judgments. He opined that “[t]he proximity and 
degree of connection between the mandate and the subsequent 
commercial activity is too lacking.”93 To bless federal action on so 
weak a factual predicate, he argued, would “undermine the 
structure of government established by the Constitution.”94 Chief 
Justice Roberts’s analysis focused squarely on the quality of the 
evidentiary nexus between the challenged law and the Com-
merce Clause95—an irrelevancy if the Court is employing ration-
al basis review. 
To recap, the Commerce Clause’s history is one character-
ized by persistent contestation over standards of review. It is a 
story in which subtle verbal reformulations in the standard of 
review yield resonant substantive transformations of federal leg-
islative authority. To be clear, I do not mean to imply that the 
substantive boundaries of doctrinal rules are irrelevant. Rather, 
the study of such formal, first-order rules in isolation misses a 
 
 90 Lopez, 514 US at 608 (Souter dissenting) (“Further glosses on rationality review, 
moreover, may be in the offing.”). In a later case upholding federal legislation, the Court 
echoed Morrison’s dissent rather than its concurrence—and went on to uphold the chal-
lenged laws. See Raich, 545 US at 19 (“Congress had a rational basis for concluding that 
leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would [ ] affect price and mar-
ket conditions.”); id at 28–29 (“The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a 
significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the 
entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”). 
 91 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 92 132 S Ct 2566 (2012) 
 93 Id at 2591 (Roberts).  
 94 Id at 2592. 
 95 Id at 2591. For an analysis of the substantive logic of The Healthcare Cases that 
emphasizes the role of evolving historical conceptions of the appropriate federal role in 
managing different species of risk, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, Federalism, Liberty, and 
Risk in NFIB v. Sebelius (University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper No 425, Apr 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2255192 (visited April 29, 2013). 
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vital element of the Court’s analytic labors, an element that 
seems especially salient to understanding legal change to feder-
alism dynamics over time. 
2. The Spending Power. 
Article I of the Constitution endows Congress with the pow-
er to collect taxes and make expenditures for “the common De-
fense and the general Welfare.”96 Both Taxation and Spending 
Powers have long been viewed as complementary, alternative 
sources of regulatory authority. Congressional powers pursuant 
to those Clauses “have never been limited . . . to cases falling 
within the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.”97 
Although the Progressive-era Court gave but lip service to that 
view,98 since the 1930s the Court has tended to refrain from im-
porting formal limits on other enumerated powers into the con-
text of Congress’s fiscal powers.99 
Instead, the Court tests the constitutionality of conditions 
attached to federal grants against four metrics.100 They must be 
(1) “in pursuit of ‘the general welfare,’” (2) “unambiguous[],” 
(3) related “to the federal interest in particular national projects 
or programs,” and (4) not independently barred by another 
 
 96 US Const Art 1, § 8, cl 1. 
 97 Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 991 at 
727 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1891). James Madison, by contrast, took the minority view that 
Congress’s fiscal powers were limited to otherwise enumerated powers. See David E. 
Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke L J 1, 27–28 (1994) (quoting Madison’s com-
ments from both the 1790s and the 1820s).  
 98 Justice Owen Roberts rejected Madison’s narrower view of the Spending Power 
in favor of the wider one proffered by Story and Hamilton. See United States v Butler, 
297 US 1, 66 (1936). But the Court then went on to invalidate the challenged federal en-
actment on the ground that it went “beyond the powers delegated to the federal govern-
ment.” Id at 68.  
 99 See Oklahoma v United States Civil Service Commission, 330 US 127, 143 (1947) 
(holding that Congress could condition an offer of federal funds to the states on the lat-
ters’ curtailing of certain officials’ partisan political activities even though “the United 
States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activity as such 
of state officials”).  
 100 Again, I assume this doctrine describes the scope of the Spending Power as con-
strued in light of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of 
the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343, 1348 (1988) (“Congress’ power to appropriate originates in 
article I, section 8. The concept of ‘necessary and proper’ legislation to carry out ‘all . . . 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States’ includes the 
power to spend public funds on authorized federal activities.”) (alteration in original), 
quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18. 
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constitutional provision.101 Because the Court has explicitly de-
ferred to Congress’s judgment in respect to the general wel-
fare,102 and because the “independent bar” rule adds little new, 
one commentator has concluded that “[n]one of these direct limi-
tations on the spending power has had any real bite.”103 The 
Healthcare Cases may have supplemented these rules by stipu-
lating that conditions imposed pursuant to federal grants cannot 
be “coercive.”104 But the scope of the latter ruling is not clear, 
and it may fairly be doubted whether the notoriously slippery 
concept of “coercion” will prove analytically tractable in even the 
medium term.105 
 
 101 South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 207–08 (1987), quoting Helvering v Davis, 301 
US 619, 640–41 (1937), Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 US 1, 17 
(1981), and Massachusetts v United States, 435 US 444, 461 (1978) (Brennan) (plurality).  
 102 See id at 207. 
 103 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke 
L J 345, 351, 355 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 104 See The Healthcare Cases, 132 S Ct at 2603–04 (Roberts) (distinguishing the ex-
pansion of Medicaid through the conditional Spending Power as distinct from the enact-
ment at issue in Dole because it placed a “gun to the head” of the states). 
 105 David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 
Tex L Rev 1197, 1200–01 (2004) (“[T]he ‘coercion’ concept touched upon in Dole and earlier 
cases is notoriously slippery both as a matter of political theory and of legal doctrine.”).  
 Even apart from its reliance on the opaque concept of coercion, Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s logic on the Spending Power is puzzling in a number of other ways. First, in 2006, 
the Court had rejected unanimously a challenge to another conditional spending enact-
ment, the Solomon Amendment, which directed that if any part of a higher educational 
institution denied military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the 
entire institution would lose certain federal funds. Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights, Inc, 547 US 47, 51, 60 (2006) (“FAIR”) (upholding the Solomon 
Amendment, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 § 541(a), Pub L 
No 104-106, 110 Stat 186, 315–16, codified as amended at 10 USC § 983). Although the 
latter opinion rested on the conclusion that recipients were being asked to alter unpro-
tected conduct, and not protected speech, it is striking that the Court in 2006 did not en-
tertain the possibility of a coercion analysis. It is not clear how the Solomon Amendment, 
which imposed penalties arguably as draconian as the Affordable Care Act, can be dis-
tinguished from the latter. 
 Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in The Healthcare Cases focused on the dis-
tinction between “existing” and “new” Medicaid funds. See The Healthcare Cases, 132 S 
Ct at 2603–07 (Roberts). But it is not clear why this distinction has constitutional 
weight. Congress, after all, could have ended Medicaid—and so denied states any 
funds—and then simply reenacted a wholly new program with new conditions. Chief 
Justice Roberts’s logic assumes that states have an ongoing entitlement to a stream of 
“existing” Medicaid funds. But it is wholly implausible to suggest that had Congress 
ended the entire Medicaid program, the states could have sued to continue it.  
 Finally, the notion of coercion is notoriously slippery and hard to operationalize, and 
Chief Justice Roberts gives no sense at all of how it might be applied to the Spending 
Power. To the contrary, by explicitly disavowing any effort to “fix a line,” Chief Justice 
Roberts deliberately declined to give meaningful guidance to lower courts and also left 
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Although direct limits on the Spending Clause have proved 
exiguous, the Court has aggressively applied an indirect bound-
ary on the Spending Power. In several cases, the Court has rea-
soned from the absence of specific language in a statute to the 
flat repudiation of purported conditions attached to a federal 
grant.106 This “notice” requirement can be understood as either a 
rule of statutory construction or as a means of operationalizing a 
fundamentally empirical judgment parallel to the analyses 
elsewhere packaged into standards of review. That is, on the 
second formulation, the notice requirement reflects an effort by 
the Court to answer a fundamentally empirical question about 
the legislative process. It functions as a proxy in an inquiry 
meant to ascertain whether an entity that receives conditional 
federal funding (typically here, a state) has, in fact, identified 
and accounted for a potential condition to that funding. In this 
light, a rigorously enforced notice rule serves to ensure a close fit 
between the actual legislative process and policy outcomes gen-
erated through conditions on federal funding. Only when the 
nexus between process and outcome is sufficiently tight can fed-
eral regulation go forward.107 
                                                                                                             
Congress in what may be a state of debilitating uncertainty. Id. Given that Chief Justice 
Roberts has railed against open-ended judicial standards in the past, he can fairly be 
criticized for inconsistency (for whatever that is worth). For an example of such criticism 
by Chief Justice Roberts, see Caperton v A. T. Massey Coal Co, 556 US 868, 893–99 
(2009) (Roberts dissenting). In all, it remains to be seen whether the Spending Clause 
ruling will turn out to be anything more than a ticket good for one ride only. See general-
ly Richard M. Re, On “A Ticket Good for One Day Only,” 16 Green Bag 2d 155 (2013). 
 106 Spending Clause litigation largely conditions the metes and bounds of private 
enforcement of a regulatory regime imposed on the states. See, for example, Sossamon v 
Texas, 131 S Ct 1651, 1658 (2011) (concluding that absent an “unequivocal expression of 
state consent” the phrase “appropriate relief” in the 2000 Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act could not be construed to permit money damages); Arlington 
Central School District Board of Education v Murphy, 548 US 291, 295–300 (2006) (same 
for experts’ fees); Barnes v Gorman, 536 US 181, 185–88 (2002) (same for punitive dam-
ages); Pennhurst, 451 US at 11, 17–27. See also Gonzaga University v Doe, 536 US 273, 
276 (2002) (finding that Spending Clause legislation cannot be enforced pursuant to 42 
USC § 1983); Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 280–81 (2001) (holding that agency 
regulations enforcing the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VI cannot be privately 
enforced). But see Winkelman v Parma City School District, 550 US 516, 526 (2007) (al-
lowing parents to proceed on their own behalf to enforce claims under the Individuals 
with Educational Disabilities Act). One commentator has described the current regime 
as a form of “double immunity” that requires not only a general waiver of sovereign im-
munity but also a specific waiver of immunity from money damages. See generally Aaron 
Tang, Double Immunity, 65 Stan L Rev 279 (2013). 
 107 This argument is distinct from, although related to, the argument that a clear 
statement rule is necessary to ensure that a provision infringing on states’ rights is the 
product of a political process that appropriately safeguards federal values. See note 304 
and accompanying text. 
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As first enforced by the Rehnquist Court, the notice rule im-
posed scant friction on federal legislative behavior.108 Its current 
formulation, by contrast, evinces sharp mistrust of the federal 
government. Absent strong textual indications on the face of a 
statute that a grantee acceded to a condition, the Court now re-
fuses to infer rules against federal grantees.  
As currently practiced, judicial “matching” of the conditions 
on federal grants to appropriate kinds of legislative processes 
has an impact that is somewhat similar to the effect of raising 
the level of formal scrutiny.109 Akin to an elevated standard of 
review, a stringent notice requirement allows the Court to limit 
Congress not merely by redrawing the formal scope of its sub-
stantive powers but also by imposing greater burdens of legisla-
tive effort. In effect, imposition of a strong notice requirement 
compels considerably more exertion by legislators in the enact-
ment process, albeit of a different kind from that elicited by a 
higher tier of scrutiny. In the Commerce Clause context, Con-
gress discharges its elevated burden by developing a more ro-
bust legislative record. By contrast, in the Spending Clause con-
text it does so by hammering out a more precise statutory deal 
and by proving up the existence of that deal in federal court.110 
In both cases, the judicial demand for greater legislative effort is 
a means to ensure that the enumerated power at stake is not 
deployed to achieve unrelated policy effects. 
In sum, while the Court (at least until the uncertain and 
opaque coercion ruling of The Healthcare Cases) has declined to 
enforce “direct” limits on the Spending Power,111 it has used the 
notice rule to gerrymander indirectly congressional power. In 
this light, the path of legal change with respect to the Spending 
Power again turns on how evidentiary burdens of various sorts 
are allocated among branches rather than on a change to first-
order doctrinal formulations. 
 
 108 See Baker and Berman, 78 Ind L J at 463 (cited in note 10). 
 109 For analysis of other contexts in which the Court engages in analogous “match-
ing” logic, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 Nw U L Rev 417, 435–
52 (2012). 
 110 All clear statement rules, though, impose frictional enactment costs. See Mat-
thew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial 
Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 Yale L J 2, 41–42 (2008). 
 111 See Bagenstos, 58 Duke L J at 355 (cited in note 103); Baker and Berman, 78 Ind 
L J at 463–69 (cited in note 10) (illustrating how each of the Dole restrictions has had 
little impact). 
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3. The Taxing Power. 
Congress’s authority to regulate through the imposition of 
tax penalties or tax expenditures arises from the same textual 
font as its spending authority.112 It also raises many of the same 
issues.113 Much like conditional spending authority, federal tax-
ing authority might oust state regulatory authority. It may do so 
by displacing a state tax base114 or by creating incentives for pri-
vate action that undermine the practical force of state regula-
tion.115 Depending on the measure at issue, federal use of the 
Taxing Power might be more or less damaging to state authority 
than use of the Spending Power. It is hard to say in the ab-
stract.116 Yet the Taxing Power has occupied only a small share 
of the Court’s attention. At the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Court invalidated some taxes as impermissibly regulatory, albeit 
without providing a lucid account of how permissible revenue-
raising measures differed from impermissible, regulatory ones.117 
Subsequent cases appeared to abandon this distinction, express-
ly disclaiming power to inquire “into the hidden motives which 
 
 112 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1. For definitions of tax penalties and tax expendi-
tures, see Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 Cal L Rev 975, 984–
92 (2011). 
 113 The Supreme Court has recognized that a “tax exemption has much the same 
effect as a cash grant to [an] organization of the amount it would have to pay on its in-
come,” while cautioning that “we of course do not mean to assert that they are in all re-
spects identical.” Regan v Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 US 540, 544 
& n 5 (1983).  
 114 This “crowding out” of state taxes is debated. Compare Mason, 99 Cal L Rev at 
977 (cited in note 112) (arguing that “by crowding out state regulation, federal tax incen-
tives may reduce opportunities for regulatory competition both among the states and be-
tween the states and the federal government”) and McCoy and Friedman, 1988 S Ct Rev 
at 86 (cited in note 10) (asserting that crowding out occurs, without supplying any evi-
dence), with Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases, Fiscal Federalism, 
and Section 164 of the Tax Code, 82 Ind L J 673, 702–09 (2007) (arguing that overlap-
ping state and federal tax bases in fact cause crowd in of state tax rather than crowd 
out). An added complication here is that states tend to conform their income tax policies 
to piggyback on the federal system. See generally Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State 
Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 Duke L J 1267 (2013).  
 115 See, for example, James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit 
Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 Va Tax Rev 545, 588–91 (2010) (developing this 
point in relation to charitable organizations).  
 116 See Mason, 99 Cal L Rev at 1028 (cited in note 112) (tallying arguments on 
both sides). 
 117 Even prior to the 1930s, the Court tacked back and forth on Taxing Power is-
sues. Compare Child Labor Tax Case, 259 US 20, 37 (1922) (striking down the Child 
Labor Act given its “prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose”), with United 
States v Doremus, 249 US 86, 95 (1919) (upholding the Narcotic Drug Act of 1914 as a 
Taxing Power enactment). 
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may move Congress.”118 By the mid-twentieth century, in the 
midst of a “dramatic expansion” in federal taxing and spend-
ing,119 the project of judicially enforced limits on the Taxing 
Power seemed to have foundered. 
The Healthcare Cases may presage a revival of Taxing Pow-
er jurisprudence. Writing the dispositive opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts voted to uphold the individual mandate as a taxing 
measure. His constitutional analysis focused on the law’s effect 
upon individuals, not states.120 He identified three indices of the 
magnitude of the tax’s burden on individuals121 in order to ascer-
tain whether the “exaction becomes so punitive that the taxing 
power does not authorize it.”122 While the individual mandate 
survived this test, the analysis hinted that other enactments 
might fail. The multifactor nature of Chief Justice Roberts’s test, 
though, compromises any secure prediction of where the future 
boundary of the Taxing Power lies.123 
Despite that precedential uncertainty, Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s analysis of the Taxing Power has methodological implica-
tions. It is plainly an exercise in “law declaration,” one that im-
plicates no substantial standard of review question. The line 
between taxes and penalties is a matter solely within the judici-
ary’s evaluative bailiwick.124 Should Taxing Power jurisprudence 
flourish along these lines, it will mark a break from the way that 
the Court defines other enumerated powers: It concerns first-
order rules for Congress, not the standard of review. Further, it 
is trained on individual, not structural constitutional, interests. 
 
 118 See Sonzinsky v United States, 300 US 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some 
measure regulatory.”). See also United States v Sanchez, 340 US 42, 44 (1950) (upholding 
federal tax on marijuana). As in the Spending Clause context, the Court has not import-
ed limitations implicit in other enumerated powers to the Taxing Power context. See id. 
 119 John Harrison, The Fiscal Powers and the 1930s: Entrenchment, 41 Wm & Mary 
L Rev 295, 296 (1999). 
 120 The Healthcare Cases, 132 S Ct at 2595–97 (majority).  
 121 Id (looking to (1) the magnitude of the burden created by the measure, (2) the 
scienter requirement, and (3) the nature of the enforcement mechanisms). This element 
of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion draws on earlier Supreme Court precedent, which em-
ployed a similar test for impermissibly coercive taxes. United States v Constantine, 296 
US 287, 293–96 (1935). 
 122 The Healthcare Cases, 132 S Ct at 2600–01 (majority). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Notice then that the doctrinal test with a stronger standard of review yielded 
success for the government in The Healthcare Cases, whereas the arguably weaker 
standard of review putatively employed in the Commerce Clause context yielded no ana-
log result for the government. Standards of review, this shows, are not always the whole 
ball game. 
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At the same time, it is unclear whether the Court will be 
able to impose meaningful limits on congressional Taxing Power 
through an exercise in law declaration without recourse to 
changes in the standard of review. A doctrinal test that hinges 
on the “degree of [Congress’s] control over individual behavior”125 
imposes no meaningful brake on the Taxing Power. For Con-
gress almost always has at its disposal a plenary substitute for 
any given tax that is challenged. The most obvious substitute is 
a conditional benefit. In an earlier case, the Roberts Court re-
jected unanimously the argument that government threats to 
withdraw conditional grants imposed constitutionally impermis-
sible burdens absent a collateral effect on constitutional 
rights.126 This means that even if Congress cannot use tax penal-
ties to influence individual behavior it can still use conditional 
transfers to the same effect (at least so long as no individual 
constitutional right is at issue, as was so in The Healthcare Cas-
es).127 Without close judicial regulation of all in-kind or cash 
transfers from the federal government to individuals, it is hard 
to see why the tax/penalty line drawn in The Healthcare Cases 
will have much effect.  
There is an ancillary puzzle raised by The Healthcare Cases’ 
treatment of the Taxing Power: It is hard to discern why Chief 
Justice Roberts’s federalism-inspired concern about “the struc-
ture of government established by the Constitution,”128 which 
was so prominent in his analysis of the Commerce Clause ques-
tion posed in that case, does not apply with equal force for the 
Taxing Power. If federal imposition of an individual mandate to 
obtain insurance via the Commerce Clause is too large an inno-
vation, why isn’t the same measure of equal concern when im-
posed under the Taxing Power? The discontinuity in modalities 
 
 125 Id at 2600. 
 126 See FAIR, 547 US at 51, 59–60. FAIR suggests the use of federal Spending Pow-
er to elicit behavior does not implicate constitutional concerns absent some effect upon 
the exercise of a protected constitutional right. See id at 59–60, 70. By contrast, The 
Healthcare Cases imply that the threat of higher taxes can violate the Constitution ab-
sent any effect on a constitutional right. See The Healthcare Cases, 132 S Ct at 2595–99 
(majority). 
 127 Conditional transfers might be justified on other grounds, such as efficiency. For 
example, the Earned Income Tax Credit, a transfer program for low-income workers ad-
ministered via refundable tax credits, is arguably more efficient than close substitutes 
such as a federal minimum wage. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U Chi L Rev 405, 474–75 (1997). 
 128 The Healthcare Cases, 132 S Ct at 2591–92 (Roberts). 
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of review by the same Justice in the same opinion has no obvi-
ous justification. 
If a tax/penalty distinction is ultimately unavailing, it is 
likely the Court’s novel effort to impose direct, doctrinal limits 
on federal taxing enactments will ultimately unravel. In that 
event, Taxing Power jurisprudence may resile to alternative, in-
direct limitations operationalized via the standard of review. 
Such indirectly imposed limitations are likely to prove echoes of 
those tactics and tools observed in other areas of enumerated 
powers jurisprudence. 
4. The Reconstruction Amendments. 
After the Civil War, Congress proposed and the nation rati-
fied three constitutional Amendments repudiating aspects of the 
antebellum racial regime.129 Each contained a provision specifi-
cally authorizing Congress to “enforce” by “appropriate legisla-
tion” newly created entitlements. The most consequential of 
these enforcement provisions has turned out to be § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which is keyed to the equality and due 
process protections vested by the first provision of that amend-
ment. This “§ 5 power” has been implicated in many important 
cases over the past decade.130 One reason that the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments have been especially important is that in the 
past two decades the Supreme Court has interpreted them to 
enable federal ouster of state sovereign immunity against money 
damages actions, a remedy Article I cannot license.131 
The jurisprudence of the Reconstruction Amendments has 
fluctuated over time. Observed variance does not turn principal-
ly on disagreements about substantive limitations on congres-
sional power but on the standard of review—that is, how much 
evidence and how tight a means-end nexus Congress needs to 
 
 129 US Const Amends XIII § 2, XIV § 5, and XV § 2 (granting Congress authority to 
enact legislation in respect to the three post–Civil War Amendments). 
 130 The exception concerns judicial challenges to sections of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 473, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1973 et seq, which 
concern § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District 
Number One v Holder, 557 US 193, 197 (2009) (reviewing a challenge to the preclearance 
provision of the Voting Rights Act). 
 131 Compare Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 455–56 (1976) (allowing ouster under 
the Fourteenth Amendment), with Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 54, 
72–73 (1996) (refusing to allow ouster under Article I). See also Alden v Maine, 527 US 
706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress could not abrogate the states’ immunity for suits 
in state court). 
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muster to animate its use of an enforcement power.132 There are 
three distinct positions on the standard of review.133 At least 
two—including the current rule—plainly diverge from the 
standard used for the Commerce Clause. 
The most latitudinarian position is also the oldest, but not 
now good law. Early judicial opinions construed the Amend-
ments’ enforcement provisions to authorize “[w]hatever legisla-
tion is . . . adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have 
in view[;] whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibi-
tions they contain, . . . if not prohibited, is brought within the 
domain of congressional power.”134 Nearly a century later, the 
Court indicated it would not “require a judicial determination 
that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress vio-
lated the Amendment” because this “would depreciate both con-
gressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility.”135 
Through the end of the 1960s, the Court remained committed to 
this weak form of rationality review.136 As Archibald Cox sum-
marized the law then, “The accepted principle upon constitu-
tional review is that the Court should assume that there are 
facts which furnish a constitutional foundation for the [ ] legisla-
tion unless that conclusion is rationally impossible.”137 
A second position has emerged in the past two decades. 
Central to this reshaping has been closer judicial scrutiny of 
 
 132 It is important to recognize that what I characterize as a standard of review 
question, because it turns on the quality of congressional fact finding, bleeds into sub-
stantive redefinition of the relevant congressional powers. 
 133 Commentators on the Reconstruction Amendments have identified the centrality 
of the standard of review question. See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction 
Power, 85 NYU L Rev 1801, 1810 (2010).  
 134 Ex parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 345–46 (1879). See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 
US 3, 13–14, 20, 50–51 (1883) (purporting to read Congress’s enforcement power in light 
of the deferential M’Culloch standard). 
 135 Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 648 (1966). 
 136 See, for example, id at 651 (holding that the M’Culloch “standard is the measure 
of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”); 
South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 326 (1966) (“The basic test to be applied in a 
case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the 
express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States.”). This 
language was used as late as 1980. See, for example, City of Rome v United States, 446 
US 156, 177 (1980). It was also used to gloss enforcement authority under the Thirteenth 
and Eighteenth Amendments. See Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409, 443 (1968) 
(Thirteenth Amendment); James Everard’s Breweries v Day, 265 US 545, 558–59 (1924) 
(Eighteenth Amendment).  
 137 Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Adju-
dication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv L Rev 91, 106 (1966). 
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congressional fact finding.138 Beginning in 1997 with City of 
Boerne v Flores,139 the Court began asking whether a federal law 
was “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to the constitutional prob-
lem being addressed rather than querying whether it was ra-
tionally related to a permitted goal.140 City of Boerne “tailor[ing]” 
entails a comparison between “the evil or wrong that Congress 
intended to remedy and the means Congress adopted to address 
that evil.”141  
Invalidating laws under this test, the Court highlights the 
absence of any “wrong”—for example, in two early cases, the ab-
sence of religious discrimination or patent infringements by the 
several states142—or alternatively the heavy regulatory burden 
on the several states.143 In practice, the Court has found inade-
quate tailoring in every single case that does not implicate a fun-
damental right or suspect class (for example, race or gender).144 
 
 138 This focus was anticipated in Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s dissent in a case 
in which the Court upheld the application of a 1970 amendment to the Voting Rights Act 
lowering the voting age in federal elections but struck down its application to state elec-
tions. See Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 117–18 (1970) (Black); id at 152–219 (Harlan 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Resisting the plurality opinion’s call for defer-
ence to congressional fact finding, Justice Harlan argued that whether or not the core 
question at stake was “factual,” it was “a matter as to which men of good will can and do 
reasonably differ.” Id at 206–07 (Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing 
id at 242–48 (Brennan dissenting). 
 139 521 US 507 (1997). 
 140 Id at 520. For subsequent applications of this test, see Coleman v Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland, 132 S Ct 1327, 1335 (2012); Board of Trustees of the University of Al-
abama v Garrett, 531 US 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62, 
82–91 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v College Savings 
Bank, 527 US 627, 647 (1999). 
 141 Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1333 (quotation marks and citation omitted), quoting Flor-
ida Prepaid, 527 US at 639 and citing City of Boerne, 521 US at 520. 
 142 See City of Boerne, 521 US at 531; Florida Prepaid, 527 US at 640–41. 
 143 See, for example, Kimel, 528 US at 82–83 (“[T]he substantive requirements the 
[Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976] imposes on state and local governments 
are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted 
by the Act.”). Kimel focuses on burdens on both state and local governments. By contrast, 
in Garrett, the Court held that evidence of unconstitutional actions by local units in “no 
sense” counted in evaluating the scope of the wrong. Garrett, 531 US at 369–71. That is, 
the Court’s doctrinal test expressly compares state wrongs to burdens on state and local 
or municipal actors.  
 144 I include gender-based discrimination in this class. See Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721, 737 (2003) (permitting money damages actions 
under the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act). For a seeming 
outlier, which authorized legislative solicitude for the disabled based on the presence of 
other fundamental rights, see Tennessee v Lane, 541 US 509, 532–33 (2004) (upholding 
applications of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act that implicated fundamen-
tal rights, such as the right of access to courts). The Lane opinion has been criticized for 
changing the relevant unit of analysis from a whole provision or statutory title to a 
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Notionally accommodating of “preventive rules” as “remedial 
measures,”145 the Court in practice tends to distinguish instances 
in which judicial protection of a right is greatest (Congress can 
act) from instances in which judicial protection is slight (Con-
gress is disabled).146 Legislative protection thus closely follows 
grooves cut by prior judicial diktat. 
City of Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test diverges 
from the quondam legal regime in two significant ways. First, 
the Court previously disavowed any need to anchor its analysis 
in the prior judicial specification of a right.147 Now, by contrast, 
the “first step” in the Court’s analysis “is to identify with some 
precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue” by look-
ing to its “prior decisions.”148 Doctrinal tethering of legislation to 
judicial opinions (and indeed Supreme Court opinions alone149) 
constitutes a shift in the substantive law, not the standard of 
review. As many have noted, the shift is in tension with the 
Court’s justifications for using rational basis review when a fun-
damental right or suspect class is not at issue.150 In the latter con-
texts, the Court had emphasized its limited institutional compe-
tence and invoked a principle of judicial restraint151 to justify the 
                                                                                                             
smaller set of applications, and the Court has not employed the same analytic move 
since. See David J. Langeland, Casenote, Misapplication of Precedent: The United States 
Supreme Court Ignores the Overbreadth of the ADA by Abrogating State Sovereignty in 
Tennessee v. Lane, 38 Creighton L Rev 1065, 1106 (2005). 
 145 City of Boerne, 521 US at 530–32. 
 146 One piece of evidence that it is the degree of judicial protection that motivates 
the Court’s tailoring requirement derives from Hibbs’s treatment of gender discrimina-
tion as addressed by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), Pub L No 103-3, 
107 Stat 6, codified as amended at 29 USC § 2601 et seq. Rather than analyzing closely 
states’ records in this context, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court engaged in 
a light review of some state laws and the “history of discrimination.” Hibbs, 538 US at 
729–30. Hibbs did not demand much by way of an empirical foundation for a law target-
ing gender discrimination (which receives a form of heightened protection under the 
Equal Protection Clause) in a way that diverged dramatically from its treatment of age 
and disability discrimination. See id at 754; Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197–99 (1976). 
 147 Morgan, 384 US at 648. 
 148 Garrett, 531 US at 365–67. See also Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1334. 
 149 Without discernible irony, the Court has thus placed Congress in a position simi-
lar to that of the state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief, who must show “a decision 
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 USC § 2254(d)(1) 
(emphasis added). Both the state prisoner and the Congress, of course, are set to their 
labors as a means to preserve federalism values—so perhaps the rough parallel is not so 
peculiar.  
 150 See, for example, Post and Siegel, 112 Yale L J at 1966–71 (cited in note 17). 
 151 City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 US 432, 441–42 
(1985). See also Garrett, 531 US at 384–85 (Breyer dissenting) (making this point and 
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“underenforcement” of constitutional norms, on the apparent as-
sumption that the political branches would pick up the slack.152 
Second, the Court has also shifted the standard of review by 
amplifying Congress’s burden of production and narrowing the 
class of cognizable legislative evidence. As initially formulated, 
the congruence and proportionality rule did not turn on the 
quality of the actual record assembled by Congress.153 Over time, 
however, the Court has narrowed its analytic lens. Now, it looks 
solely at the record in fact before the enacting Congress; it also 
distinguishes among different sorts of record evidence.154 By 
2000, in reviewing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990155 (ADA), the Court was distinguishing between evidence 
submitted to Congress and evidence submitted to a congression-
al “Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans 
with Disabilities”156 that “held hearings in every State, attended 
by more than 30,000 people, including thousands who had expe-
rienced discrimination first hand.”157 Moreover, Congress must 
memorialize its evidence in specific forms. The Court, in Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett,158 complained 
that Congress had made no express finding of “a pattern of un-
constitutional behavior by the States” in the Act’s legislative find-
ings.159 By distinguishing between different species of evidence 
                                                                                                             
criticizing the Court for forcing Congress “to adopt rules or presumptions that reflect a 
court’s institutional limitations”).  
 152 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1213 (1978). 
 153 Hence, in City of Boerne, the Court identified a “lack of support in the legislative 
record” but also emphasized it was 
not [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s] most serious shortcoming. Judi-
cial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record 
Congress compiles but “on due regard for the decision of the body constitution-
ally appointed to decide.” As a general matter, it is for Congress to determine 
the method by which it will reach a decision. 
City of Boerne, 521 US at 531–32 (citation omitted), quoting Mitchell, 400 US at 207 
(Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Kimel, 528 US at 91 (sug-
gesting that a “lack of support” in the legislative record “is not determinative”). The 
quoted statement in Kimel is hard to square with what the Court does in that case.  
 154 See, for example, Garrett, 531 US at 370 (“Congress assembled only such mini-
mal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the disa-
bled.”); Kimel, 528 US at 89 (dismissing the legislative record as comprised “almost en-
tirely of isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports”). 
 155 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) §§ 101–08, Pub L No 101-336, 104 
Stat 327, 330–37, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 12111–17. 
 156 Garrett, 531 US at 370–71. 
 157 Id at 377 (Breyer dissenting). 
 158 531 US 356 (2001). 
 159 Id at 371. 
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that might emerge from the legislative process, and simultane-
ously declining to consider later-generated evidence, the Garrett 
Court imposed a standard of review arguably more onerous than 
that employed in some First Amendment cases.160 By “focus[ing] 
on legislative findings, rather than on the evidence that could 
support the legislation,” and then requiring specific forms of leg-
islative evidence, the Court made “a sharp break with the rheto-
ric, if not the reality, of the Court’s precedents”161 and thus 
opened a gap with Commerce Clause practice.162 
The shift in standard of review catalyzed by City of Boerne 
is underwritten by the Justices’ concern to preserve the inde-
pendent meaning of the Constitution, as determined by the 
Court itself, against legislative manipulation. Absent a congru-
ence and proportionality check, the Court frets, “Congress could 
define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
meaning,” a power that would rob the Constitution of its status 
as “superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.”163 
Rather than a “necessary partner”164 in elaborating constitutional 
norms, Congress is here perceived as a potential interloper upon 
the judicial monopoly of constitutional settlement.165 
Imposition of congruence and proportionality review, in 
short, meaningfully retrenches federal authority under the Re-
construction Amendments. Yet it may not be the Court’s last 
word on the matter—for there is a third position the Court 
might still adopt on the standard of review for § 5 cases. In re-
cent opinions, Justice Antonin Scalia has calumniated congru-
ence and proportionality as too “flabby” and “a standing invitation 
 
 160 For example, in applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court has not only allowed 
consideration of “predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied” but also 
directed a remand to the district court for “the introduction of some additional evidence.” 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 667 (1994).  
 161 Buzbee and Schapiro, 54 Stan L Rev at 118 (cited in note 17). 
 162 See Post and Siegel, 78 Ind L J at 15–16 (cited in note 17) (arguing that “the 
Court would not require Congress in the exercise of its commerce power to adopt such 
juricentric rules of evidence” as used in the § 5 context). Section 5 review seems to me 
more onerous than even the most exiguous form of Commerce Clause review. 
 163 City of Boerne, 521 US at 529. See also Garrett, 531 US at 374 (distinguishing 
Congress’s “final authority” on matters of “desirable public policy” from its power to “re-
write the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court”). 
 164 Caminker, 53 Stan L Rev at 1172 (cited in note 17). See also Post and Siegel, 110 
Yale L J at 515 (cited in note 17). 
 165 So understood, City of Boerne has provoked considerable criticism on the grounds 
that the Court is (a) applying a model of legislative fact finding that ill fits the realities 
of congressional action and (b) illicitly claiming an inappropriate interpretative monopo-
ly over the determination of constitutional meaning. See note 17.  
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to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.”166 
Invoking the federal courts’ limited ability to “scour the legisla-
tive record in search of evidence that supports the congressional 
action,” Justice Scalia would cabin Congress to regulating con-
duct “that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”167 To the 
extent a majority of the Justices already look askance at prophy-
lactic measures benefiting nonfundamental rights or nonsuspect 
classes, Justice Scalia may be pushing on an unlocked door: the 
Court already seems to require a form of close tailoring under 
City of Boerne, and little precludes it from gradually raising the 
bar higher still. 
5. The Intellectual Property Clause. 
In closing, I turn to a power not usually addressed in the 
same breath as the Commerce Clause or the Spending Power to 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of standard of review questions: 
the so-called Intellectual Property Clause of Article I, which en-
dows Congress with authority to legislate on patents and copy-
rights.168 Two recent challenges to congressional expansions of 
this Clause’s reach have spurred the Court to clarify the appli-
cable standard of review.169 In so doing, the Court has evinced a 
capacious deference to Congress’s empirical judgments that is at 
odds with its resurgent closer scrutiny of other enumerated 
powers. 
In Eldred v Ashcroft,170 the Court upheld provisions of the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act171 that enlarged the 
term of works under copyright at the time of the statute’s en-
actment.172 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 
 
 166 Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1338 (Scalia concurring), quoting Lane, 541 US at 557–58 
(Scalia dissenting). 
 167 Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1338 (Scalia concurring). In Justice Scalia’s one-way ratchet, a 
court that invokes its institutional limitations to curtail its own recognition of rights would 
then invoke those very same institutional limitations to block Congress from doing so. 
 168 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8 (vesting Congress with power to “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). Consider Fromer, 61 Duke 
L J at 1331 n 1 (cited in note 11) (noting that the Clause, although commonly called the 
Intellectual Property Clause, does not reach trademark). 
 169 See Golan v Holder, 132 S Ct 873, 878 (2012); Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 193 
(2003).  
 170 537 US 186 (2003). 
 171 Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998). 
 172 Eldred, 537 US at 192–94 (noting the scope of challenge), citing Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat at 2827–28, codified as amended at 
17 USC §§ 302, 304. 
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Eldred is noteworthy in two respects. First, it held that the In-
tellectual Property Clause “empowers Congress to determine the 
intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judg-
ment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”173 Judicial supervision, 
on the Eldred Court’s view, was confined to the identification of 
“a rational exercise” of congressional authority.174 Second, and 
correlatively, the Eldred Court rejected an effort to impose the 
congruence and proportionality limits from § 5 jurisprudence on-
to the Intellectual Property Clause on the ground that the latter, 
unlike § 5, endowed the legislature to define, and not merely en-
force, rights.175 
The 2012 judgment in Golan v Holder176 eliminated doubt 
about the amplitudinous breadth of judicial deference in the In-
tellectual Property Clause context. Golan concerned § 514 of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act,177 which grants copyright pro-
tection to certain preexisting works that have been protected in 
their country of origin but lack protection in the United 
States.178 Writing again for the Court, Justice Ginsburg quoted 
her own “pathmarking” Eldred opinion and reiterated the gen-
erous scope of judicial deference to congressional judgments un-
der the Intellectual Property Clause.179 
The methodology of Eldred and Golan diverges from the 
scrutiny used in respect to the Commerce Clause, Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, and Spending and Taxing Powers. Whether 
or not this surprises depends on which Justice one focuses upon. 
 
 173 Eldred, 537 US at 222 (emphasis added). 
 174 Id at 204–06 & n 10 (rejecting the dissent’s argument for application of “a 
heightened, three-part test for the constitutionality of copyright enactments”). For a pre-
Eldred argument for robust judicial review, see Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds 
of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Pri-
vate Rights in Information, 15 Berkeley Tech L J 535, 558–75 (2000). 
 175 Eldred, 537 US at 218 (“Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce commands con-
tained in and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Copyright Clause, in 
contrast, empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right.”) (citation 
omitted). In his dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer also resisted the importation of § 5 
standards, although he would have imposed a greater evidentiary burden on Congress. 
Id at 244–45 (Breyer dissenting). Some commentators argue that Justice Ginsburg in-
voked rational basis review “without explaining why she did so.” See, for example, Paul 
M. Schwartz and William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Exten-
sion and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 Yale L J 2331, 2357 (2003). 
 176 132 S Ct 873 (2012). 
 177 Pub L No 103-465, 108 Stat 4809, 4976–81 (1994), codified as amended at 
17 USC §§ 104A, 109(a). 
 178 Golan, 132 S Ct at 881–83, quoting Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 108 
Stat at 4976–81, codified as amended at 17 USC §§ 104A, 109(a). 
 179 Golan, 132 S Ct at 888–89, quoting Eldred, 537 US at 222. 
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That Justice Ginsburg—never the Court’s foremost maven of 
close judicial scrutiny of the enumerated powers—should cast so 
latitudinous a net is no surprise. What should raise an eyebrow 
is that the other signatories of the Eldred opinion, “Justices 
Kennedy, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas[,] did not 
deem it necessary to police congressional exercise of the enu-
merated power and did not write to distinguish this case from 
previous decisions that did find this obligation.”180 
C. The Tiers of Scrutiny in the Judicial Review of Enumerated 
Powers: A Capsule Summary 
The account developed so far in this Part has highlighted 
how pivotal the standard of review is in practice for the judicial 
review of Congress’s enumerated powers. It also demonstrates 
that there are synchronic as well as diachronic discontinuities in 
the standards of review employed with respect to different enu-
merated powers.181 That is, we have a de facto system of “tiers of 
scrutiny” for the enumerated powers, albeit one that is poorly 
articulated and almost wholly undertheorized.  
Stepping back then, what does this tiers-of-review system 
look like in broad outline? Consider, as a rough approximation of 
current practice, the following: In essence, the Court employs a 
bifurcated approach in the judicial review of enumerated pow-
ers. Economic regulation under the Commerce Clause, like eco-
nomic enactments based on Taxing, Spending, and Intellectual 
Property–related Powers trigger light scrutiny. By contrast, 
when Congress is likely engaged in noneconomic social policy 
making—whether by attempting to reach noneconomic “sub-
stantial effects” on interstate commerce or by invoking the Re-
construction Amendments—the Court peers at a law more scru-
pulously. The economic/noneconomic distinction in the third 
prong of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, on this view, assumes 
 
 180 Schwartz and Treanor, 112 Yale L J at 2360 (cited in note 175). Judicial defer-
ence to legislative delineations of intellectual property interests also contrasts with the 
same Justices’ close scrutiny of congressional efforts to address intellectual property in-
fringements by the states. See Florida Prepaid, 527 US at 640–44. 
 181 This is not the same as saying that the Court is using standards rather than 
rules—another distinction often raised in the legal literature. See, for example, Louis 
Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557, 559 (1992). 
Rather, my point is that there is a set of related legal questions that might logically be 
analyzed in the same way but in fact have spawned a diversity of legal tests, including 
both more rule-like and more standard-like tests. 
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a wider resonance and greater explanatory force across different 
enumerated powers. 
This first cut is surely imperfect. Arguably, the close judicial 
scrutiny of notice to federal grantees in the Spending Power con-
text does not seem to fit this pattern neatly.182 But consider the 
following gloss on the latter line of doctrine: Let us posit that 
states are more zealous about the control of social policy than 
economic policy (which is not, perhaps, a wholly unreasonable 
assumption about contemporary politics). Perhaps the notice 
rule for Spending Power enactments works in practice as a 
means of ensuring state control of those social issues, and there-
by ends up reinforcing an economic/noneconomic distinction. 
Constitutionally mandated clarity in the textual specification of 
conditions upon federal funding enables states to object to ex-
traneous or novel conditions on those funds. This in effect pre-
serves states’ control of policy domains about which they care 
enough to litigate—especially social policy questions. In practice, 
it may be the case that the notice rule often inhibits the federal 
government from exploiting its convergent interest in funding a 
particular state regulatory activity (say, education or incarcera-
tion) to further a social policy (say, the regulation of adolescent 
sexuality or the provision of religious accommodations).183 If the 
notice rule does in fact tend to operate against federal efforts to 
control social policy in this way, it might plausibly be under-
stood as yet another means of limiting congressional control of 
‘noneconomic’ matters. To be sure, when Congress acts with suf-
ficient clarity—that is, when it pays a sufficiently high enact-
ment tax184—then it can cast its regulatory net into such do-
mains. But often Congress will not able to pay the necessary 
enactment tax, leaving states with discretion over noneconomic 
social policy matters. 
A second payoff from this synoptic review is the light it casts 
on historical mechanisms of diachronic legal change. The prece-
dential trajectories tracked here show how the Court often ad-
justs congressional power by changing standards of review ra-
ther than redrawing first-order limits on congressional power. 
 
 182 See Part I.B.2. 
 183 To be clear, I am merely explaining a potential line of argument here and do not 
mean to imply endorsement of one side or another of that dispute. I also do not mean to 
imply that there is a “proper” domain of state regulation—a claim that is contested, con-
troversial, and orthogonal to the argument here. 
 184 See Stephenson, 118 Yale L J at 41–42 (cited in note 110) (noting the possibility 
of judicial imposition of frictional enactment costs).  
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During the New Deal period, for example, the Court progressive-
ly loosened the evidentiary requirements of judicial review and 
eased the necessary nexus between statutes and their anchoring 
enumerated powers. These changes had the effect of enlarging 
federal power. In the 1990s, the Rehnquist Court initiated a se-
lective increase in the intensity of judicial review of federal regu-
lation of noneconomic activities.185 With the Reconstruction 
Amendments, the standard of review remained stable through 
the 1970s, only to shift dramatically in the late 1990s via refor-
mulation of the standard of review.186 In the spending context, 
moreover, I have argued that the recent ratcheting up of the no-
tice requirement can also be glossed as a form of heightened 
scrutiny.187 These historical narratives suggest that recalibration 
of the standard of review is as potent a tool, or even more potent 
a tool, for effecting change to the substantive scope of congres-
sional power as tinkering with the substantive doctrinal bound-
aries on such authority. 
At a minimum, these two generalizations point toward the 
tiers of scrutiny in enumerated powers cases as important inde-
pendent objects of study. What they do not illuminate, and what 
the next two Parts address, is whether the creation of tiered re-
view has positive or undesirable collateral effects. 
II.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERGENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
FOR DIFFERENT ENUMERATED POWERS 
So what effects does a tiers-of-scrutiny arrangement have? 
This Part identifies two undesirable collateral consequences of 
the Court’s novel employment of tiers of scrutiny in enumerated 
powers jurisprudence. First, tiered review creates unjustifiable 
gaps between different enumerated powers that legislators can 
arbitrage for their own ends. Second, the tiers of scrutiny pro-
vide a subsidy for what pejoratively is called judicial activism. In 
both these ways, putative agents of the public—acting pursuant 
to supposedly cabining legal authority—are empowered to be-
have strategically to pursue their own interests. This freewheel-
ing discretion, which is a form of agency slack, is generally 
 
 185 See text accompanying notes 78–79 (discussing the Court’s recalibration of the 
standard of review in order to change the scope of federal power). 
 186 Part I.B.4. 
 187 Part I.B.2. 
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thought undesirable.188 Agency slack makes it more likely that 
democratic preferences will not translate into policy change—
although not for any principled or normatively defensible rea-
son. Although the identified effects arise only in some, but not 
all, instances of judicial review, together they furnish a reason 
to investigate closely whether tiers of scrutiny have robust nor-
mative justifications. 
A. The Possibility of Legislative Arbitrage 
In the enumerated powers context—unlike in the funda-
mental rights or equal protection domains—the tiers of scrutiny 
allow legislators to engage in what might be called doctrinal ar-
bitrage. That is, because the reach of different enumerated pow-
ers overlaps substantially, members of Congress are able to ex-
ploit the fact that a statute would be valid under one 
enumerated power but invalid under a different one. Strategic 
behavior by official actors is not per se harmful or undesirable. 
But it has arguably undesirable consequences here.  
When the Court employs differentially geared standards of 
review, legislators can on occasion exploit those differences by 
enacting a law under one power that would lack sufficient evi-
dentiary foundations pursuant to another. Some congressional 
arbitrage is intrinsic to a Constitution with multiple, overlap-
ping enumerating powers, and hence unavoidable. Yet using tiers 
of scrutiny for enumerated powers expands the range of arbitrage 
possibilities, and so enlarges the scope for strategic legislative 
behavior at the margin. The effect may not be large, but there 
are still reasons to view such legislative conduct with at least 
puzzlement and even skepticism when it flows from the mere 
convenience of organizing enumerated powers into a tractable 
doctrinal framework for the purpose of judicial review. 
For an example of how discontinuities in judicial review of 
enumerated powers can matter, we might look at Congress’s 
success (and its failure) enacting anti-circumvention measures. 
These are measures designed not merely to confront a policy 
problem frontally but also to mitigate the risk of private circum-
vention of a direct prohibition. In the spending context, the 
 
 188 For a brief, helpful introduction to the problem of agency costs, see Eric A. Pos-
ner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in Eric A. Posner, ed, Chicago Lectures in 
Law and Economics 225, 225–29 (Foundation 2000). For applications in the public law 
context, see Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am J Polit Sci 739, 
758 (1984). 
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Court has permitted Congress large freedom of regulatory maneu-
ver in this regard, whereas under the Reconstruction Amend-
ments it has resisted legislative efforts to address circumvention.  
Take first Pierce County, Washington v Guillen,189 a Spend-
ing Power case where the Court concluded that “Congress could 
reasonably believe that adopting a [challenged] measure elimi-
nating an unforeseen side effect of [the measure’s] information-
gathering requirement [related to traffic accidents] would result 
in more diligent collection efforts” by the states to comply with 
federal commands.190 On the basis of this “reasonabl[e]” assump-
tion, the Court found the challenged federal statute lawful.191  
By contrast, consider how anti-circumvention measures are 
treated in the § 5 context. In Coleman v Court of Appeals of 
Maryland,192 the Court rejected the proposition that the Family 
and Medical Leave Act of 1993’s193 (FMLA) self-care provision 
was a “necessary adjunct”194 to the FMLA’s direct bar on preg-
nancy- and gender-based discrimination that was necessary to 
prevent employers from trying to circumvent the FMLA’s core 
command by modulating hiring decisions.195  
The gap between these cases’ different outcomes turned on 
the burden of evidentiary production placed on Congress. In 
Guillen, the Court showed scant interest in testing Congress’s 
empirical claim that prophylactic measures were necessary.196 
By contrast, in Coleman, it flyspecked Congress’s determination 
to the same effect.197 Yet it is hardly implausible to imagine 
Congress enacting the self-care provisions of the FMLA pursu-
ant to the Spending Power rather than § 5. Taking Guillen and 
Coleman at face value suggests that such a hypothetical provi-
sion would be upheld under the Spending Power even though it 
had been invalidated under Congress’s § 5 authority. The lesson 
of Guillen and Coleman, in short, is that Congress should, to the 
 
 189 537 US 129 (2003). 
 190 Id at 147. See also Sabri v United States, 541 US 600, 605 (2004) (“Congress does 
not have to sit by and accept the risk [that federal policy goals will be thwarted by pri-
vate circumventory action].”). 
 191 Guillen, 537 US at 147 (using a reasonableness standard in evaluating the con-
nection between the purpose statute and the powers granted to Congress). 
 192 132 S Ct 1327 (2012). 
 193 Pub L No 103-3, 107 Stat 6, codified as amended at 29 USC § 2601 et seq. 
 194 Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1335. 
 195 See id at 1334–35; id at 1339 (Ginsburg dissenting) (explaining the functions of 
the FMLA provisions). 
 196 Guillen, 537 US at 147. 
 197 Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1334–35. 
 616  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:575 
   
extent it is feasible, enact regulations that are required as ad-
junct anti-circumvention measures using the Spending Clause, 
rather than the Reconstruction Amendments. 
As noted, it is important to emphasize that the facial varia-
tion in the substantive reach of enumerated powers means that 
some congressional arbitrage is always possible. But that does 
not entail the further conclusion that some additional arbitrage 
opportunities enabled at the margin by a system of tiers of scru-
tiny are warranted. My focus is on that marginal supplement, 
which may be of uncertain magnitude but is certainly not a null 
set. Whatever its magnitude, there are three reasons for worry-
ing about such marginal increases in arbitrage opportunities 
created by discontinuities in standards of review. 
First, it is not obvious why Congress would be able to enact 
a federal statute using a given legislative evidentiary record 
with one power when it would be barred from doing so with an-
other solely because of the insufficiency of that record. When en-
acting laws, Congress does not always identify which enumerat-
ed power it is relying upon.198 The use of tiers of scrutiny in the 
enumerated powers context thus entails that a law can stand or 
fall on a ground that has no immediate normative relevance—
whether the correct enumerated power has been picked out in 
light of the record that Congress has assembled. It is instead to 
make the outcome of judicial review a capricious function of 
what might be viewed as a superfluous detail of the legislative 
process. This may enable strategic legislative behavior or it 
might lead to arbitrary invalidations. Either way, it is hard to 
see the result as positive. 
Second, and relatedly, it is not at all clear that using tiers of 
scrutiny will have any useful deterrent effect on legislative ac-
tion. This is so not least because it may not be feasible for Con-
gress to sequence its deliberation in a way that allows it first to 
identify an enumerated power and then to conduct appropriately 
tailored empirical inquiry. Timing constraints, complex procedural 
rules in each chamber, and exogenous crises can make se-
quenced deliberation of this kind impossible. In many instances, 
 
 198 For example, the legislative findings of the Affordable Care Act do not invoke a 
specific enumerated power, leaving courts with discretion on which to examine. Afforda-
ble Care Act §§ 1501(a), 10106(a), 124 Stat at 242–44, 907–09, codified at 42 USC 
§ 18091(a)(1)–(3). See, for example, Florida v United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, 648 F3d 1235, 1314 (11th Cir 2011) (relying on “legislative history of 
the Act” to draw an inference about the use vel non of the Taxing Power).  
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local political exigencies mean that there is only a short window 
in which a law can be passed, or only a limited range of proce-
dural vehicles for accomplishing that end.199  
If Congress in these instances cannot always be expected to 
match the enumerated power to an appropriately developed rec-
ord, penalizing its failure to do so will not pick out cases in 
which Congress has behaved in a troublesome manner or has 
acted upon illicit motives. Nor will it necessarily elicit better leg-
islative behavior in the future. More likely, the prospect of inval-
idation based on parameters of the legislative process that are 
largely outside an enacting coalition’s control merely has the ef-
fect of making congressional action across-the-board less likely. 
In a system of bicameralism and presentment already sharply 
criticized for its status quo–preserving effects,200 it is not at all 
clear why further disempowerment of democratically creden-
tialed officials, merely for the analytic convenience of federal 
judges, is desirable or even defensible. 
Compounding this friction on legislative action is an inter-
temporal effect: When the Court has altered the standard of re-
view in past cases, it has generally penalized an earlier Con-
gress that was necessarily unaware of the new burden of 
production.201 This is a penalty imposed retroactively for viola-
tion of a procedural rule imposed by the Court. But it is not clear 
why Congress should be sanctioned in this fashion for a rule 
with which it had no contemporaneous reason to comply. (Relat-
edly, it is also not clear why a failure of congressional process of 
any sort warrants invalidation of the ensuing statute. Not all 
procedural violations of the Article I framework undermine the 
validity of a law.202 Given that the Court does not enforce all 
 
 199 See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitu-
tion?, 61 NC L Rev 587, 609 (1983) (describing the timing limitations that Congress op-
erates under and the negative effect it has on “thorough and accurate legislation”). 
 200 See Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking 35 (Chicago 
1998) (explaining why the structure of federal lawmaking conduces to the underproduc-
tion of laws). See also William N. Eskridge Jr, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre 
Dame L Rev 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (describing opportunities for House or Senate mem-
bers to derail proposed legislation at “vetogates,” which are necessary stages in the legis-
lative process where one group or another has the ability to derail a bill). 
 201 Professors Ruth Colker and James Brudney thus criticize “the crystal ball nature 
of the Court’s decision[s]” on standards of review. Colker and Brudney, 100 Mich L Rev at 
111 (cited in note 17). See also Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 1723 (cited in note 17). 
 202 See Field v Clark, 143 US 649, 672–73 (1892) (announcing the “enrolled bill” doc-
trine, which bars the Court from looking beyond the text of an enrolled bill to identify 
procedural failures). The enrolled bill doctrine has been applied to bar judicial review of 
assertions that bills were not enacted through the necessary steps of bicameralism and 
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rules of constitutionally mandated procedure, it is hardly obvi-
ous that Congress’s failure to comply with a judicially imposed 
rule of legislative procedure should be fatal to a law’s survival.203) 
Finally, the use of a tiers-of-review system imposes an epis-
temic tax on successful legislating with potentially troubling in-
tracameral distributive consequences. In order to produce laws 
that survive judicial review, a legislator must know not only how 
to assemble a legislative coalition but also how to navigate 
downstream litigation peril that arises in what will appear to 
some as arbitrary ways. This tax is less burdensome for more 
experienced and better-staffed legislators, and most costly for 
novice or marginal legislators.204 Indeed, the latter may be espe-
cially prone to discount or entirely overlook the low-salience, 
downstream peril of judicial invalidation on the seemingly tech-
nical matter of which enumerated power is at work. The net ef-
fect of the tax is to shift authority from newer to older, and more 
entrenched, legislators.205 In this fashion, judicial employment of 
tiers of scrutiny may foster an “arbitrarily chosen threshold [ ] 
lead[ing] to systematic distributive inequalities,”206 which is 
hard to justify even if it is not independently unconstitutional.207 
                                                                                                             
presentment. See Public Citizen v United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, 486 F3d 1342, 1351 (DC Cir 2007) (noting that “the Courts of Appeals have consist-
ently invoked Marshall Field” and applying the doctrine to bar a challenge to a law 
based on the claim that different versions of the law passed the two houses); OneSimple-
Loan v U.S. Secretary of Education, 496 F3d 197, 203 (2d Cir 2007) (same). 
 203 I assume here that legislators view invalidation of a law they supported as a 
penalty. This to me is a reasonable assumption, but I recognize that it should be subject-
ed to empirical testing.  
 204 In effect, the tax imposed by judicial employment of tiers of scrutiny is likely to 
fall hardest on those without extensive support from interest-group lobbies. Recent work 
has shown that lobbying operates “as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of 
policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically se-
lected legislators.” Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Sub-
sidy, 100 Am Polit Sci Rev 69, 69 (2006) (emphasis omitted). Obviously, those legislators 
most likely to be lobbied will rarely be marginal or minority representatives. 
 205 In other contexts, some Justices have treated incumbency effects as good reason 
to be suspicious of a law’s constitutionality. See, for example, McConnell v FEC, 540 US 
93, 306 (2003) (Kennedy dissenting) (describing campaign finance laws as “an incumben-
cy protection plan”). I am not confident that the marginal effect of tiered scrutiny is an-
ywhere near as large as that of campaign finance reform, but the general suspicion of 
incumbency protection is nonetheless relevant here.  
 206 Melissa Schwartzberg, The Arbitrariness of Supermajority Rules, 49 Soc Sci Info 
61, 69 (2010).  
 207 It is important to note that the point here holds more generally in respect to doc-
trinal complexity. The more rebarbative the relevant rules with which Congress must 
comply to enact constitutionally valid laws, the greater the bias in favor of more tenured, 
more experienced legislators. To the extent this distributive effect is perceived as desira-
ble, it is a ground for doctrinal parsimony.  
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In summary, a tiered system of judicial review for enumer-
ated powers has the potential to lead to an aleatory or inequita-
ble pattern of invalidations due to its effects on the legislative 
process. It may also enlarge the pool of opportunities for legisla-
tors to engage in strategic behavior. And to reward (or penalize) 
Congress by invalidating a law on grounds that are not within 
Congress’s control or do not exist at the time of enactment im-
poses a serious friction on the realization of democratic prefer-
ences. All of these effects “produce or reify inequalities” between 
legislators or voters such that “those supporting [the use of 
tiered scrutiny] are under a special obligation to give reasons to 
those potentially disadvantaged.”208 
B. Tiers of Review and the Inflation of Judicial Discretion 
The creation of arbitrage opportunities for Congress is not 
the sole way in which the tiered structure of enumerated powers 
review alters the scope and nature of official discretion. Building 
on Part II.A, I show in this Section how using tiers of scrutiny 
for enumerated powers also changes the operation of judicial 
discretion along four separate margins. None of these four 
mechanisms is obviously desirable. Their cumulative effect is to 
vest the federal bench with a measure of free-floating policy dis-
cretion that allows for the imposition of judges’ own personal 
preferences regardless of democratic or constitutional warrants. 
First, in those instances in which Congress fails to specify 
an enumerated power, the following troubling species of judicial 
discretion arises: A court can decide whether to uphold or inval-
idate a law once it has reviewed the legislative record, depend-
ing on whether it infers the use of one legislative power or an-
other. When a law would be valid if enacted with one 
enumerated power, but not with another, the constitutionality of 
a law would turn on an unfettered and unguided exercise of dis-
cretion by a federal court respecting the constitutional basis of 
the enactment.  
Although Congress might be expected to include a reference 
to the enumerated power used in most cases, this is far from 
universally so. In enacting a law as recent and as important as 
the 2010 Affordable Care Act, for example, Congress failed to 
specify which enumerated power was at stake. As the divergent 
views expressed by the Justices in The Healthcare Cases as to 
 
 208 Id at 71. 
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whether Congress had even invoked the Taxing Power show,209 
judges can read quite different meanings into the resulting si-
lence. In effect, the constitutionality of so significant a law as 
the Affordable Care Act plausibly turned on how one (or more) 
Justices inferred a choice of enumerated powers from legislative 
silence.210  
The Justices in The Healthcare Cases possessed such unfet-
tered and outcome-determinative discretion solely by dint of the 
discontinuities between tiers of judicial review. Their discretion 
along this margin correlates in no meaningful way with an abil-
ity to promote either democratic or constitutional values. To the 
contrary, the discretion enabled by discontinuities in regard to 
judicial scrutiny appears to enlarge the ability of judges to dis-
place democratic choice with personal preferences without any 
corresponding positive yield in constitutional norms.  
Second, as my previous account of doctrinal change through 
history underscored, the Court has long resorted to the recali-
bration of the standard of review to facilitate substantive ad-
justments to the scope of federal regulatory authority.211 This 
history suggests that federal judges, whether explicitly or inad-
vertently, use recalibration of the standard of review as an ad-
vantageous and preferred mechanism for altering the federal-
state balance of power.  
Why should this be so? One possibility is the lower salience 
of standards of review to the public and to elected officials. 
Changes to the standard of review are plausibly characterized as 
lower salience than changes to substantive legal rules because the 
latter “bring[] to the fore the element of judicial choice inherent in 
a decision to reject an old rule and establish a new one.”212 By con-
trast, using the standard of review to alter the bounds of federal 
legislative power increases the cost to an observer of the Court 
who is seeking to discern a decision’s significance. Directing 
 
 209 Compare The Healthcare Cases, 132 S Ct at 2600 (majority) (holding that the 
Act’s requirement that individuals without health insurance pay a penalty can be “char-
acterized as a tax”), with id at 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting) 
(“[T]o say that the Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax is not to interpret the stat-
ute but to rewrite it.”). 
 210 Note that, to the extent the Court supervises the constitutionality of laws enact-
ed before the emergence of a tiered system of review of enumerated powers, we might 
predict that Congress will often have failed to be precise in this regard. In effect, the 
Court gains the most freewheeling discretion with respect to older enactments.  
 211 See Part I.B. 
 212 Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the 
Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv L Rev 56, 66 (1965). 
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Congress to meet a “congruence and proportionality” standard is 
less dramatic, and has less obvious consequences, than saying 
plainly that Congress can only enforce rights previously recog-
nized by the Court. 
Lowering the salience of judicially instigated changes to the 
scope of federal power renders substantive alterations of the law 
less costly for the federal bench in those instances in which the 
Court anticipates political “backlash.”213 In consequence, reliance 
on the standard of review as a mechanism of legal change injects 
elasticity into what Professor Alexander Bickel labeled the “nat-
ural quantitative limit” that political resistance imposes on judi-
cial elaboration of constitutional norms.214 To be sure, not all ju-
dicially initiated legal changes will elicit public opposition. 
Sometimes a court even accrues public support by changing the 
metes and bounds of federal authority.215 A judge who predicts 
that a legal change will secure public acclamation, however, can 
toggle back to the higher salience modality of doctrinal elabora-
tion. Having the option of tweaking the standard of review thus 
enlarges discretionary judicial control over the delineation of 
federal power.216 To the extent federal judges can deploy differ-
ent standards of review strategically, the existence of tiered 
scrutiny enlarges their freedom to act in the teeth of public dis-
approbation.217 It is, in effect, a subsidy for what some pejora-
tively term “judicial activism.”218 
Third, use of tiers of scrutiny expands judicial discretion by 
altering the unit of doctrinal change. In effect, a tiered system of 
 
 213 For a succinct account of the idea of backlash, see Cass R. Sunstein, Backlash’s 
Travels, 42 Harv CR–CL L Rev 435, 435–36 (2007) (“[I]f the Court rules in a certain way 
in such cases, public outrage could significantly affect national politics and undermine 
the very cause that the advocates of the ruling are attempting to promote.”). 
 214 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 94 (Yale 1978). 
 215 For example, the impact of The Healthcare Cases on the Taxing Power. See text 
accompanying notes 120–26. 
 216 For another account of how the Court might leverage the relative salience of is-
sues to maintain public support, see David Fontana and Donald Braman, Judicial Back-
lash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 Colum L Rev 731, 
781–84 (2012). 
 217 Keith E. Whittington, Book Review, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavior-
alist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 L & Soc Inq 601, 611 (2000) (noting broad sup-
port for the proposition that justices act “strategically, in the sense of understanding and 
anticipating the likely responses of others to the judge’s own actions”) (emphasis omitted). 
 218 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 287 (Harvard 2008) (defining the activ-
ism/restraint spectrum according to whether a decision “expands the Court’s authority 
relative to that of the other branches of government”). I use the term “judicial activism” 
not as a pejorative label for decisions I happen to dislike, but rather to signal the possi-
bility of agency slack on judges’ part. 
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review increases the potential granularity of legal change and 
thereby enables the Court to engage in more subtle (and so more 
difficult and costly to observe) adjustments to the substantive 
law and, hence, to make doctrinal microadjustments in line with 
its policy preferences.  
To see this point, consider a counterfactual world in which 
the standard of review for all enumerated powers moved in lock-
step. A judicially initiated change under these counterfactual 
circumstances could hardly have a fine-grained character. The 
Supreme Court could not, for example, pick out the Commerce 
Clause and enlarge congressional power under that provision 
without doing the same for the Spending and Taxing Power. 
Equally, it could not single out and narrow rights-protecting en-
actments under the Reconstruction Amendments without also 
restricting Congress’s power to address economic questions. Un-
der these counterfactual conditions, there is a kind of “lumpi-
ness” that acts as a friction on judicial innovation.  
In contrast, a world (such as ours) in which standards of re-
view vary among enumerated powers is one in which recalibrat-
ing scrutiny can be a far more “practical tool of judicial activ-
ism.”219 Discontinuous forms of scrutiny enable more subtle and 
targeted strategies of judicial transformation of the substantive 
law. Judges can thus engage in more granular amendments to 
the doctrinal landscape in ways that conform to their personal 
preferences about policy without triggering as large an adverse 
public response.  
Finally, the fourth important effect of variable standards of 
review is that the latter may render outcomes less stable by in-
creasing somewhat at the margin the risk of cycling between 
outcomes. This in turn can yield either instability over time or 
stable but arbitrary outcomes.  
Cycling refers to the instability of collective choice within 
multimember bodies. Stated otherwise, any outcome from a de-
cision protocol such as majority choice can (under certain condi-
tions) be ousted by another round of the same deliberative 
mechanism under certain conditions.220 For example, it can be 
 
 219 Harper v Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 US 86, 107–08 (1993) (Scalia 
concurring). 
 220 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (Yale 2d ed 
1963) (providing general conditions under which the exercise of collective choices 
through majority-rule voting does not yield stable outcomes). See also Dennis C. Mueller, 
Public Choice III § 5.2 at 84–85 (Cambridge 2003) (providing a comprehensive technical 
account of cycling); Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and 
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demonstrated formally that sequential majority-rule votes over 
pairs of three or more potential outcomes do not yield a stable 
outcome because any given majority-vote winner can be unseat-
ed by an alternative. Cycling creates “circular preferences, path 
dependence, and other problems” that may render any outcome 
of a collective choice procedure normatively suspect.221  
The possibility of cycling developed in a body of social choice 
theory initially formalized by economists such as Kenneth Ar-
row,222 although the basic notion goes back to the late eight-
eenth-century work of Condorcet.223 Although the pervasiveness 
of cycling in actual legislatures is highly contested,224 the intui-
tion that fairness in decision rules may need to be traded away 
to guard against the arbitrariness of results remains a potent 
source of critique. In the legal context, commentators have pro-
posed that majority-rule decisions of multimember courts (such 
as the Supreme Court) may be characterized by cycling and have 
even identified potential cycles to prove their case.225 
The existence of an Arrovian paradox in a decisional context 
nevertheless does not lead inexorably to chaos. Rather, the pos-
sibility of cycling may often not materialize because institutional 
designers have specified basic decisional protocols in ways that 
promote stability. They might do this, for instance, by designat-
ing an “agenda setter” with the power to lead a collective “to an 
outcome particularly pleasing to the agenda setter, and keep it 
there.”226 Any such decision protocol employed to solve an em-
bedded cycling problem is, however, “rife with possibilities of stra-
tegic exploitation.”227 In the public law context, these possibilities 
                                                                                                             
the Voting Paradox, 75 Va L Rev 971, 984–88 (1989) (describing succinctly cycling and 
the underlying voting paradox). 
 221 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802, 824 (1982).  
 222 See Arrow, Social Choice at 94–96 (cited in note 220); Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L J 1219, 1224 (1994) (identifying Ar-
row’s work on social choice as establishing the relevant field of inquiry). 
 223 H.P. Young, Condorcet’s Theory of Voting, 82 Am Polit Sci Rev 1231, 1232–34 
(1988) (describing Condorcet’s findings). 
 224 See, for example, Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended 17, 86–92 (Cambridge 
2003) (“[T]he cycles that are alleged to make democracy meaningless are rare.”); Donald 
P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applica-
tions in Political Science 107–46 (Yale 1994) (reviewing empirical studies and expressing 
skepticism about their value). 
 225 For the leading account, see Easterbrook, 95 Harv L Rev at 815−21 (cited in 
note 221). 
 226 Mueller, Public Choice III § 5.13 at 115 (cited in note 220). See also Kenneth A. 
Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 
37 Pub Choice 503, 507 (1981). 
 227 Leo Katz, Why the Law Is So Perverse 101 (Chicago 2011). 
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often may redound to judges’ benefit, effectively increasing their 
ability to insert policy preferences into the law.228 Hence, a juris-
prudence characterized by cycling is one in which judges can 
manipulate the sequence in which issues are raised and decided so 
as to maximize the attainment of their own extrinsic preferences. 
Concerns about instability, cycling, and agenda manipula-
tions arise only when a group’s aggregated preferences over an 
issue are multidimensional. When a group’s preferences over op-
tions are unidimensional and single peaked, by contrast, cycling 
does not arise.229 All else being equal, it is less likely that an ex-
ercise of judicial review that comprises one decision upon the 
substantive rule of law will engender cycling problems.  
The installation of tiers of scrutiny, however, has the effect 
of adding a new dimension to the judges’ decisions. All things be-
ing equal, the addition of this new element to the judicial deci-
sion renders the possibility of instability more likely.230 The more 
likely instability is, the more likely it is that a line of jurispru-
dence will be characterized by either unstable or unjustifiable 
outcomes.231 
 
 228 Consider Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimem-
ber Courts, 97 Mich L Rev 2297, 2332–33 (1999); Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 
1751–52 (cited in note 17). 
 229 See Tracey E. George and Robert J. Pushaw Jr, How Is Constitutional Law 
Made?, 100 Mich L Rev 1265, 1272 (2002) (“[C]ycling is inevitable on a theoretical level 
when groups make even the simplest decision among multidimensional options.”). Pro-
fessor Dennis Mueller identifies this effect by explaining, “If all issues were unidimen-
sional, multipeaked preferences of the type [that induce a cycle] might be sufficiently 
unlikely so that cycling would not be much of a problem. In a multidimensional world, 
however, preferences [with multiple peaks] seem quite plausible.” Mueller, Public Choice 
III § 5.4 at 87 (cited in note 220). See also John S. Dryzek and Christian List, Social 
Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation, 33 Brit J Polit Sci 1, 12–13 
(2008) (explaining that “single-peakedness[] is already a sufficient condition” for avoid-
ing cycling) (emphasis omitted); Easterbrook, 95 Harv L Rev at 826 (cited in note 221) 
(“Multi-peakedness becomes more and more likely as the number of dimensions of choice 
increases.”).  
 230 Moreover, Professor Leo Katz argues, “[A]s long as the legal doctrines are mul-
ticriterial in character—which virtually all legal doctrines are—loopholes . . . are bound 
to arise.” Katz, Why the Law Is So Perverse at 118 (cited in note 227). As I explain in the 
following paragraph in the text, there are reasons to believe that single questions of law 
declaration are not inevitably multicriterial. I accept Professor Katz’s argument that be-
cause a substantive legal standard “synthesize[s] a variety of different criteria for evalu-
ating a transaction” there is a de facto “guarantee” of “discontinuity.” Id at 181.  
 231 Indeed, there is an argument that the Court’s federalism jurisprudence already 
manifests cycling over (1) substantive federal grounds and (2) preferences regarding 
statutory interpretation methods. See Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 1751–52 (cited 
in note 17). 
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It is important to emphasize here that even if a multimem-
ber court focuses on the single question how a substantive rule 
of constitutional law applies to a given statute, it is possible that 
the combined preferences of the judges can generate cycling. 
Even on the merits of a single, substantive legal question, judges 
might be tugged in diverse directions by concerns about fidelity 
to history, arguments by analogy, and even “economic, social, 
and political factors,” such that their individual preferences will 
generate collectively multipeaked preferences.232 Accordingly, 
compressing judicial review into a single question is no guaran-
tee against instability.   
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to think that 
cycling problems are less likely to arise when the Court only has 
to resolve a single point of law, and not specify in addition an 
applicable standard of review. First, it is quite plausible that in 
many cases judges’ preferences on a single question will be or-
dered in such a way as not to produce cycling. Where five justic-
es consistently value federalism more than national power, for 
example, no cycling arises. Indeed, questions about the scope of 
congressional power are especially liable to be collapsed into the 
single, simple question of the federal balance. Second, within the 
bounds of substantive law declaration, the Court has developed 
doctrinal devices such as standing and stare decisis that argua-
bly quell cycling.233 By ruling out of bounds certain considera-
tions, these decisions tend to eliminate the multiplicity of op-
tions necessary to trigger a cycle. 
To the extent it is desirable to avoid cycling problems, there-
fore, there is some reason to think that addition of the standard 
of review question to the doctrinal framework for enumerated 
powers will yield undesirable effects.  
* * * 
This Part has suggested that discontinuities in the stand-
ards of review for various enumerated powers may well have 
troubling normative consequences for the expected incentives of 
legislatures and judges. It thus tees up the question whether 
there is a plausible normative justification for tiers of scrutiny in 
 
 232 Easterbrook, 95 Harv L Rev at 826 (cited in note 221). 
 233 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Su-
preme Court Decision Making 58, 170–77 (Michigan 2000). 
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enumerated powers jurisprudence warranting these costs—a 
question taken up in the following Part. 
III.  JUSTIFYING DIVERGENT STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN 
ENUMERATED POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part analyzes potential justifications for tiers of scruti-
ny in enumerated powers jurisprudence. It assumes that the 
enumerated powers are not coterminous in their substantive 
reach and considers whether federal judges are warranted in 
adopting differentiated degrees of skepticism with respect to 
each distinct enumerated power. A positive answer would justify 
the status quo. In contrast, a negative response would provide a 
reason for reform and course correction. 
To that end, this Part identifies and analyzes six potential 
explanations for modulating standards of review by enumerated 
power. To deflate any potential suspense, I should say here that 
each is ultimately found wanting. I conclude that not only does 
variegated judicial review of enumerated powers have undesira-
ble consequences—as Part II demonstrated—but that further it 
lacks a redemptive justification. Together, the troubling conse-
quences and the absence of countervailing benefits suggest that 
federal judges should not vary the standard of review according 
to the enumerated power under consideration. There should be 
no discontinuities in the judicial review of enumerated powers, 
but instead a lockstep standard of review.  
This conclusion, I should stress at the outset, is not a sub 
rosa endorsement of either enlarged federal power or greater 
state autonomy. My argument is directed at the procedures that 
the Court employs to delineate bounds on federal regulatory 
authority. It is intended to be neutral in respect to the underly-
ing question of federalism and reflects no implicit agenda in 
that respect. 
A. Textualist and Originalist Justifications 
I first consider the textualist and originalist justification for 
varying judicial review among the diverse enumerated powers. 
With one exception, I conclude, they are fragile—and the poten-
tial exception is in any event at odds with current practice. 
The Constitution in general and Article III in particular are 
silent about judicial review, although there is a case for inferring 
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the practice from the text.234 If, as with many consequential 
questions of constitutional structure, “the text doesn’t give clear 
answers” to inquiries about the distribution of authority to liq-
uidate constitutional uncertainties,”235 then a fortiori, no power-
ful textual basis directly obtains for differentially calibrating re-
view for different enumerated powers. To the extent we have a 
pre-Ratification practice upon which to draw for the elaboration 
of standards of review, it is one of Thayerian deference and even 
extreme unwillingness to invalidate federal legislation.236 Varia-
tions in the intensity of judicial review, in consequence, cannot 
be derived from Article III’s text or an account of judicial re-
view’s historical origins.  
Turning to the Constitution’s provisions on enumerated leg-
islative powers, it is not clear how any modulation in the stand-
ard of judicial review between congressional authorities can be 
derived from those parts of the Constitution’s text. Rather, the 
text strongly suggests that Congress’s enumerated powers move 
in lockstep. In particular, this is the natural inference to be 
drawn from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which applies not 
only to the powers catalogued in Article I, § 8, but also to “all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States.”237 The Necessary and Proper Clause, as pre-
viously noted, provides a broad and uniform gloss across all 
Congress’s legislative powers.238 Finding variance among the 
enumerated powers would therefore contradict the principle that 
“absent a good reason for doing otherwise, similar constitutional 
commands should be treated similarly.”239 In short, the larger 
 
 234 I do not question that the legitimacy of judicial review can be justified casuisti-
cally (in the best sense of that word) from the constitutional text. See John Harrison, The 
Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 Va L Rev 333, 363–69 
(1998). My point is that it is not plain on the document’s face. 
 235 David A. Strauss, Book Review, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 Harv L Rev 1532, 
1535 (2013). 
 236 See note 39. See also William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and 
the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U Pa L Rev 491, 527 (1994) (describing pre-
Ratification proceedings in which participants believed a statute had to be “dramatically 
at odds with the constitution” for it to be unconstitutional). 
 237 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18. But see Engdahl, 44 Duke L J at 18–20 (cited in note 
97) (arguing that the Spending Power is non-enumerated and therefore cannot be 
glossed with the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 238 Consider Harrison, Book Review, 78 U Chi L Rev at 1122 (cited in note 33) (suggest-
ing the Necessary and Proper Clause implies that “a main power brings its incidents with it”). 
 239 Amar, 112 Harv L Rev at 790–91 (cited in note 16). 
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constitutional text strongly counsels against springing and shift-
ing the strength of judicial review from one clause to another.240 
This argument against discontinuities in the strength of ju-
dicial review can be extended to the later-enacted Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, which employ the term “appropriate” rather 
than the words “necessary and proper.”241 Despite the textual 
disanalogy, the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments “in-
voke[d] McCulloch in interpreting the reach of Section Five.”242 
Early judicial constructions of the Reconstruction Amendments 
confirmed that understanding of the term “appropriate.”243 This 
enactment history, along with the semantic parallels between 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and later enforcement provi-
sions—that is, the close relation between proper and appropri-
ate—suggest that there should be no shift in deference as courts 
move from Article I to later amendments. 
Herein, though, lies the exception: A historically contextual-
ized reading of the Reconstruction Amendments might under-
write the use of weaker judicial review than that exercised in the 
supervision of earlier, vested congressional powers. On one read-
ing, history reflects the Reconstruction-era framers’ “desire not 
to vest the judiciary with exclusive or even primary jurisdiction 
 
 240 As an alternative to textual arguments, it might be contended that the tiers of 
scrutiny can be justified by attention to the “original meaning” of state sovereignty. In-
deed, the Court has justified its protection of state interests in terms of “an older concep-
tion of the sovereign” derived from the colonial, monarchical period and the late-
eighteenth-century law of nations. Judith Resnik and Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult 
to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan L Rev 
1921, 1923 (2003). But see Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal 
Perspective, 89 Va L Rev 1, 6–7 (2003) (suggesting that the concept of state sovereignty 
should be given meaning by drawing on international law). Notions of sovereignty, at 
least as invoked by the Supreme Court, however, are insufficiently granular to provide a 
meaningful guide for distinguishing among different species of enumerated federal pow-
ers. If anything, an analysis founded in terms of sovereignty leads back to an analysis of 
the long-abandoned “dual federalism” model. See note 317. 
 241 US Const Amends XIII § 2, XIV § 5, XV § 2. 
 242 Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv L Rev 153, 178 n 153 (1997) (noting that the change from 
“necessary and proper” to “appropriate” in § 5 was met without protest); id at 188 (“[The 
term ‘appropriate’] has its origins in the latitudinarian construction of congressional 
power in McCulloch.”). See also Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 
Harv J Legis 187, 200–03 (2005). 
 243 See, for example, Ex Parte Virginia, 100 US 339, 345–46 (1879). See also Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 US 3, 13–14 (1883) (pointing to Congress’s power to pass “corrective 
legislation . . . such as may be necessary and proper”). 
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with respect to safeguarding Section 1 rights.”244 Suspicion of 
federal judges’ sympathies for Southern states’ resistance to the 
race-related elements of Reconstruction provided ample justifi-
cation for shifting power away from the courts. A reading of the 
text that accounted not only for the federalism-related expecta-
tions of 1787, but also those of 1868, might plausibly find more 
leeway for legislative judgment in the Reconstruction Amend-
ments than Article I.245  
Of course, even if one rejected the argument from textual 
parallelism coupled to enactment history, and instead accepted 
this alternative reading, it would require current practice to be 
flipped on its head. As such, it supplies little justification for 
the currently observed tiers of scrutiny in enumerated powers 
jurisprudence.246 
B. Judicial Supremacy and the Diverse Ends of Congressional 
Power 
A second argument for changing the strength of judicial re-
view among different enumerated powers might take inspiration 
from the City of Boerne Court’s concern with distinguishing 
Congress’s “final authority” on matters of “desirable public policy” 
from any power to “rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid 
down by th[e] Court.”247 The argument would seek to distinguish 
cases in which judicial supremacy is most needful by looking at 
where the threat from Congress is gravest.  
Accepting arguendo the “juricentric” assumption upon 
which this worry rests,248 judicial employment of tiers of scrutiny 
might be explained and justified as follows: In some instances, 
 
 244 Caminker, 53 Stan L Rev at 1163–64 (cited in note 17). By contrast, the City of 
Boerne Court relied on the fact that the term “necessary and proper” was amended at 
one point to “appropriate,” although it failed to supply compelling reasons why a restric-
tive inference would properly be drawn from an amendment that at least facially seemed 
to expand congressional power. City of Boerne, 521 US at 517, 529–30. Reviewing the 
“complex” historical record, one commentator described the Court’s reading here as “fac-
ile.” Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruc-
tion, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum L Rev 1992, 2017 (2003).  
 245 There is, accordingly, no little irony in the fact that it is the Court’s most promi-
nent originalist who counsels for stricter review of laws enacted pursuant to the Recon-
struction Amendments. See Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1338 (2012) (Scalia concurring). 
 246 More generally, the Court’s insensitivity to Reconstruction-era history inflects its 
understanding of state sovereignty and federalism in ways that are hard to justify on a 
theory of original meaning that is not confined to 1787.  
 247 Garrett, 531 US at 374. See also City of Boerne, 521 US at 529. 
 248 But see Post and Siegel, 78 Ind L J at 17–30 (cited in note 17) (developing a criti-
cism of the “juricentric Constitution”). 
 630  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:575 
   
the ends Congress can promote are defined by the Constitution 
itself. In others, these ends are defined by exogenously given so-
cial, economic, and political conditions. The enforcement provi-
sions of the Reconstruction Amendments fall into the first cate-
gory of intrinsically defined goals because the objects of 
congressional action are rights created in those Amendments’ 
respective opening provisions. By contrast, the Commerce 
Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the Spending and 
Taxing Powers plausibly fall into the second category of extrin-
sically defined ends pertaining to private rights. In the first cat-
egory, where the end that Congress is empowered to promote is 
itself constitutionally defined, there is a risk—not present in 
other cases—of legislative trenching on constitutional meaning 
in ways that compromise the “supreme” nature of the Constitu-
tion.249 Hence, in that first category alone, and not in the second 
category, judicial review should be more exacting. 
Facially alluring, this line of argument ultimately rests on 
unstated, undefended, and perhaps indefensible epistemological 
foundations. At the threshold, we can begin by doubting that 
there is a clear distinction between (1) congressional powers de-
fined in terms of endogenous constitutional norms and (2) con-
gressional powers defined by reference to exogenous empirical 
facts. It requires more than an ipse dixit to explain why “com-
merce,” but not “religious liberty,” should be treated as a social 
fact and not a legal category.250 Both preexist the Constitution. 
Both are altered, directly or indirectly, by the existence of feder-
al institutions. Neither, therefore, has a preordained Platonic 
form that can be insulated from transformation under the tidal 
pressures of time and technological innovation. One might press 
this point yet further by venturing that the congressional power 
to define “commerce” poses in practice an even greater threat to 
judicial supremacy, and thus to the supremacy of the constitu-
tional text, than any legislative power to define “equal protec-
tion” under the Fourteenth Amendment in light of the centrality 
of the Commerce Clause to federal regulatory power. 
 
 249 City of Boerne, 521 US at 529, quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). 
 250 See Devins, 50 Duke L J at 1178 (cited in note 17) (arguing that in some instanc-
es “the law-fact distinction may be a judicial conceit . . . used to prop up a conclusion 
about whether the Court or Congress should settle an issue”). One might indeed read 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s separate concurrence in Lopez as making precisely such a 
claim about the legal nature of “commerce.” Lopez, 514 US at 602 (Thomas concurring). 
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One might also reframe the Reconstruction Amendment 
cases in terms of factual judgments rather than legal conclu-
sions no different from the policy judgments about economic de-
velopment, invention, or immigration at stake in respect to Arti-
cle I powers. On this view, the existence vel non of discrimination 
against the disabled and aged in Garrett and Kimel v Florida 
Board of Regents251 respectively are “gauzy, unresolvable socio-
logical disputes about what is happening in the real world of 
state government.”252 They are not questions about what the 
Constitution means. Accordingly, when Congress makes judg-
ments about the extent of discriminatory behavior for the pur-
poses of § 5 legislation, it is not making a judgment about the 
Constitution at all. It is rather making a judgment about the 
tangible world beyond the four corners of the law, one that is in-
distinguishable from policy judgments salient to the use of other 
enumerated powers. 
Worse for this justification of tiered review, the alleged 
threat to judicial supremacy—and hence to the Constitution—
from § 5 legislation in particular turns out to be rather finespun 
and evanescent. Consider in this regard City of Boerne and its 
progeny. City of Boerne invalidated a private right of action cre-
ated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993253 (RFRA) 
against the states on the ground that RFRA created a shield 
against disparate religious impact. In the Court’s view, this un-
constitutionally displaced its 1990 ruling that individuals have a 
right only against disparate religious treatment.254 A fair read-
ing of City of Boerne would hence focus upon the legislative 
ouster of a disparate treatment rule for a disparate impact rule 
in religious liberty cases.  
In later cases, however, the Court upheld almost the same 
disparate impact right of action first against the federal gov-
ernment (under what remained of RFRA)255 and then against the 
states (under a later law enacted under the Spending Power).256 
 
 251 528 US 62 (2000). 
 252 Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 1749 (cited in note 17). 
 253 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488. 
 254 See City of Boerne, 521 US at 529–36. The Court had earlier held the Free Exer-
cise Clause entailed no disparate impact standard. See Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494 US 872, 882 (1990). 
 255 See, for example, Gonzales v O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 
US 418, 423 (2006) (applying RFRA to grant an injunction allowing a religious group to 
use hallucinogenic tea that would otherwise violate the Controlled Substances Act). 
 256 See Cutter v Wilkinson, 544 US 709, 714 (2005) (requiring accommodation of re-
ligion for prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act). 
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The Court has also shown no inclination to oust the disparate 
impact rule presently embodied in almost half the states 
through “mini-RFRAs.”257 As a consequence of these post–City of 
Boerne decisions and state enactments, a private right of action 
against state action with a disparate impact on believers is often 
available. Clearly then, not everything that has the practical ef-
fect of second-guessing the Court’s judgment about constitution-
al liberty interests is problematic. 
In any case, it is hardly clear that the Constitution’s status 
as supreme law is threatened or compromised solely and mainly 
because the federal legislature uses an enumerated power that 
is defined in relation to a constitutional entitlement. The Court 
itself concedes that “preventive rules [as] remedial measures” 
are acceptable under the Reconstruction Amendments.258 So it 
cannot be that the mere invocation of an enforcement power will 
necessarily instantiate a definitive act of constitutional interpre-
tation.259 When Congress expressly says it is enacting a prophy-
lactic rule, judicial supremacy is not plainly impugned in any 
meaningful way.  
Nevertheless, perhaps the justification for discontinuities in 
judicial scrutiny resides in the potential “expressive” effects of 
Congress’s selection of one enumerated power over others. 
When, for example, it enacts a disparate impact rule for reli-
gious liberty cases using the § 5 power, perhaps this signals to 
the public Congress’s disagreement with the Court’s view of the 
Constitution.260 But it is hard to see why this can justify tiered 
judicial review. In light of the Court’s enunciated tolerance for 
prophylaxis under the Reconstruction Amendments and in light 
of the repeated government avowals of the prophylactic, rather 
than definitional, goals of a given law, it is hard to discern any 
reason to be concerned with expressive effects. No reasonable 
member of the public, under those circumstances, could believe 
that Congress has altered the meaning of the Constitution. As a 
 
 257 See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Reli-
gious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv L Rev 155, 211–
12 (2004). 
 258 City of Boerne, 521 US at 530–32. 
 259 Note that any exercise of the Commerce Clause also implies a view on the correct 
meaning of that Clause.  
 260 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive 
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J Legal Stud 725, 726 (1998) (defining expressive effects 
as ones that “not only bring about certain immediate material consequences but also ex-
press . . . values and attitudes”).  
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result, it is hard to see any reason why a rule enacted under § 5 
would pose a constitutional concern on expressive grounds when 
the same rule enacted under the Spending Power would not.261  
My argument here resonates with (but is somewhat orthog-
onal to) arguments developed in previous scholarship on the 
Court’s § 5 jurisprudence. As several scholars have noted, con-
stitutional rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment have 
been defined and defended by the Court and political branches 
in collaboration.262 The Court may impose limits on its own re-
medial role out of comity-driven regard for its coequal branch 
collaborators, but it is a non sequitur to extend constraints im-
posed on the basis of limited judicial competence to the actions 
of the two democratically elected branches.263 More fundamental-
ly, other commentators have argued that “virtually any situa-
tion where Congress appears to be changing the meaning of a 
right” can be redescribed as “the addition or subtraction of a 
prophylactic remedy.”264 The permeability of the rights/remedy 
boundary means that any distinction between right and remedy 
is unlikely to generate coherent outcomes but will be vulnerable 
instead to the ad hoc exercise of judicial discretion. 
In short, the logic of City of Boerne assumes that Congress’s 
choice of one enumerated power over another is freighted—
symbolically? semantically? institutionally?—such that it imper-
ils the constitutional order in ways the same statute promulgat-
ed under a different enumerated power would not. This assump-
tion underwrites a ratcheting up in the level of scrutiny for § 5 
legislation. But the Court ultimately supplies no account of this 
mysterious threat to the supremacy of judicially created consti-
tutional law. It may fairly be doubted that one exists. 
 
 261 I do not think it is plausible to say that the Reconstruction Amendments are cat-
egorically different in the magnitude of their normative and expressive effect from Arti-
cle I, § 8. The latter, after all, was a radical transformation of national power—albeit one 
to which we are more than habituated. Alternatively, one might argue that a certain Re-
construction Amendment, that is, the Thirteenth Amendment, has a particularly im-
portant expressive dimension because it bears on private as well as state conduct. See, 
for example, Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409, 413 (1968). Again, it is especially 
hard to see why this underwrites greater suspicion of congressional action. 
 262 See, for example, Caminker, 53 Stan L Rev at 1172–73 (cited in note 17); Post 
and Siegel, 110 Yale L J at 515–19 (cited in note 17). See also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 875 (1999) (noting that 
even the “‘true’ principle of Brown only later began to come into focus . . . through the 
lens of remedy”). 
 263 See McConnell, 111 Harv L Rev at 156 (cited in note 242).  
 264 Levinson, 99 Colum L Rev at 915–16 (cited in note 262). 
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C. Variations in the Political Safeguards of Federalism 
If attention to the symbolic consequences of enumerated 
powers cannot explain tiers of scrutiny, can the latter be ex-
plained in terms of federalism concerns? There are two ways of 
reasoning from federalism values265 to a tiered system of judicial 
review for enumerated powers. The first, more powerful and so-
phisticated line of argument focuses on whether and when fed-
eralism-related interests belonging to the states are protected in 
the national political process or alternatively are vulnerable to 
federal ouster inside the Beltway. This Section considers that 
argument; the following Section takes up a variant federalism-
related argument. 
The first federalism-based argument for varying judicial re-
view by enumerated power focuses on the interaction between 
the judicial protection of federalism and its promotion through 
political safeguards. On this view, the central reason for limiting 
federal regulatory authority is the preservation of an autono-
mous domain of state regulation.266 Variation in the standard of 
review flows from the waxing and waning of the need for judicial 
intervention.  
The Constitution, on this view, provides serial, complemen-
tary methods of preserving the appropriate balance between the 
federal government and the several states against disequili-
brating actions by the federal government.267 In The Federalist, 
Madison identified state governments as “constituent and essen-
tial parts of the federal Government,” with “each of the principal 
branches of the federal Government [owing] its existence more 
or less to the favor of the State Governments.”268 On Madison’s 
view, involvement of the states in the “federalist political pro-
cess might more effectively promote the very substantive values 
federalism is supposed to serve than any attempt to enforce 
 
 265 I do not mean to obscure the deep ambiguities of this term. Rather, Part III.D 
explores possible “federalism values.” For the sake of the present argument, that inter-
nal variation can be ignored. 
 266 Again, I should emphasize that, as explored in Part III.D, this is not the only po-
tential “end” of federalism.  
 267 For a careful definition of how “exploitation” by the federal government might be 
defined in welfarist terms, see Bednar, The Robust Federation at 66–73 (cited in note 25) 
(distinguishing federal encroachment from interstate burden shifting and state shirking). 
 268 Federalist 45 (Madison), in The Federalist 308, 311 (cited in note 24). See also 
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543, 552 (1954) 
(“Congress, from its composition and the mode of its selection, tends to reflect the ‘local 
spirit’ predicted by Madison.”).  
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those values directly.”269 In 1985, the Supreme Court endorsed 
this view, opining that the “principal means chosen by the 
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system 
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.”270 
Madison’s argument that the several states are represented 
in the federal legislative process has been criticized on the 
ground that “mechanisms that (possibly) give state and local in-
terests a greater voice in national politics”—such as the proto-
cols for selecting representatives and senators—“do not neces-
sarily protect state and local institutions.”271 At the same time, 
the Madisonian account has also been supplemented by the 
claim that national political parties have stepped in as vehicles 
for fostering a healthy “political dependency of state and federal 
officials” and thereby serving as conduits for the articulation of 
state interests in the national political process.272 On this updated 
 
 269 Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Feder-
alism after Garcia, 1985 S Ct Rev 341, 373–76. 
 270 Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 550 (1985). 
Strictly speaking, Garcia is good law in the sense that its rejection of the “traditional 
government functions” test is still a valid rule of law. Id at 545; Kevin J. O’Brien, Federal 
Regulation of State Employment under the Commerce Clause and “National Defense” 
Powers: Constitutional Issues Presented by the Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooper-
ation Act, 49 BC L Rev 1175, 1186–87 (2008). But see John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safe-
guards of Federalism, 70 S Cal L Rev 1311, 1311–12, 1334–35 (1997). Obviously, as Part 
I demonstrated, the Court has assumed a larger role in policing federal power since 
1985, albeit on different doctrinal grounds. 
 271 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism, 100 Colum L Rev 215, 223–27 (2000) (emphasis added). See also William H. 
Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 Am Polit Sci Rev 452, 456 (1955) (find-
ing little evidence that the Senate protected states’ interests). The normative payoff of 
this criticism of Madison’s structural arguments is less clear than Professor Larry Kra-
mer assumes. On the one hand, fidelity to the Constitution may require that current 
generations respect whatever design decisions were made in the original document—
including ones that no longer function in the way the Founding generation either ex-
pected or intended—or it might require fidelity to some more abstract, atextual goal 
called “federalism.” But see Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Free-
standing Federalism, 122 Harv L Rev F 98, 101 (2009) (“[I]nclusion of broad and ambig-
uous provisions makes it unlikely that the founders intended to preclude all reference to 
general federalism purposes and norms.”). To claim that a failure in the Framers’ struc-
tural devices for preserving federalism imposes a demand on current generations to find 
substitutes is to place a great deal of normative weight on the second, nontextual feder-
alism norm.  
 272 Kramer, 100 Colum L Rev at 282 (cited in note 271); Elizabeth Garrett, Enhanc-
ing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 
45 U Kan L Rev 1113, 1120–27 (1997) (describing the relevant mechanisms). See also 
Bednar, The Robust Federation at 113–16 (cited in note 25) (describing a theory of politi-
cal safeguards and noting its weakness—because the “motivation of the part[ies] is to 
win elections,” their actions will not always converge with what is required to defend 
federalism-related goods). See also John D. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How 
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view of Madison’s conception—which, inevitably, has garnered 
its own challengers273—the values of federalism are promoted 
through subconstitutional, political channels as well as through 
the formal lineaments of constitutional design. 
Yet acceptance of a political-branch mechanism for the promo-
tion of federalism values need not oust the courts of a federalism-
related role. Even if the primary safeguard of the appropriate 
federal-state balance is institutional and political in nature, aux-
iliary protections in the form of judicial promotion of federalism 
might still be warranted for those instances in which the politi-
cal safeguards fail.274 Judicial promotion of federalism, from this 
perspective, operates as a failsafe or “backup.”275 Federal judges 
should accordingly vary the intensity of their scrutiny depending 
upon whether they believe the federal lawmaking process under 
a given enumerated power is likely to account properly for state 
interests. They should apply a more searching form of review in 
those domains where state interests are most likely to be ignored. 
This process-based justification for intermittently more am-
plitudinous judicial review echoes Professor John Hart Ely’s cel-
ebrated account of a jurisprudence of individual rights based on 
predictions of political process failure.276 Drawing inspiration 
from Professor Ely’s argument for the judicial defense of indi-
vidual rights, one might posit that a jurisprudence of federalism 
could be specified by asking when in expectation the national po-
litical process is most likely to break down at cost to the several 
states’ constitutional interests. In those latter instances, judicial 
invalidation should have a softer trigger. Such a theory of feder-
alism-related political “process failure”277 would provide a founda-
tion for organizing the enumerated powers into a system of tiers 
                                                                                                             
States Protect Their Interests in National Policymaking 215 (Oklahoma 2009) (conclud-
ing, on the basis of several case studies, that “state officials have numerous means at 
their disposal for resisting perceived federal encroachments on their interests”). 
 273 Among the most insightful is Professors Paul Frymer and Albert Yoon’s argu-
ment that parties, as “instruments of political combat and assertion,” cannot play the 
role that Professor Kramer ascribes to them. Paul Frymer and Albert Yoon, Political 
Parties, Representation, and Federal Safeguards, 96 Nw U L Rev 977, 982 (2002). 
 274 See Bednar, The Robust Federation at 132 (cited in note 25) (“[Judicial and political 
s]afeguards also bolster one another’s performance and stand in where others are weak.”). 
 275 Saikrishna B. Prakash and John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Federalism Theories, 79 Tex L Rev 1459, 1479 (2001) (“[T]he federal courts must 
play backup to Congress, to ensure that any unconstitutional legislation that emerges 
from the political process . . . will not survive.”).  
 276 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 73–74 
(Harvard 1980). 
 277 Rapaczynski, 1985 S Ct Rev at 391 (cited in note 269). 
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that tracked the relative degree of peril to federalism values 
from various enumerated powers.278 
There are two possible accounts of political process failure 
that might underwrite pro-federalism judicial interventions. 
Neither, however, provides a firm foundation for using tiers of 
scrutiny in enumerated powers jurisprudence. First, it is possi-
ble to argue that courts should engage in more fulsome scrutiny 
of federal action when there is a substantial risk that Congress 
has failed to internalize the costs of its policy making and in-
stead shifted them onto the states. This can be styled as a prob-
lem of “unfunded mandates,” or “hidden taxation,” on states “by 
poorly monitored, opportunistic legislators.”279 Even if individual 
legislators are alert to states’ interests, this line of argument 
suggests, their incentives may nonetheless conduce to a tragedy 
of the commons problem, where the commons being plundered is 
the states’ reserved domain of fiscal and regulatory domain.280 
Accordingly, federal courts should strive to identify those enu-
merated powers that conduce to a heightened congressional 
temptation to engage in cost externalization to the several 
states. 
A threshold problem with this line of argument is that it is 
not at all clear that the probability of constitutionally problematic 
cost shifting281 rises or falls in any predictable way as Congress 
 
 278 This parallels the contribution of political process theory in the individual rights 
context. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 
Va L Rev 747, 783 (1991) (“The most political process theory can hope to achieve is iden-
tification, in a value-neutral manner, of particular subject matter areas in which legisla-
tive decisionmaking suffers from systemic biases.”). 
 279 Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth 
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 Vand L Rev 1355, 
1356, 1389 (1993). See also Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and 
Other Regulations, 93 Nw U L Rev 351, 351–52 (1999) (noting the possibility that “unfet-
tered decisionmakers underestimate the costs they impose, issue commands that are 
selfish, engage in inefficient and unfair redistributions, or are simply driven too much by 
the political benefits their directives generate”). 
 280 Consider Garrett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1118 (cited in note 272) (arguing that “col-
lective action problems undermine responsible decisionmaking” and induce deleterious 
cost shifting by Congress). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Ex-
plain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 Stan L Rev (forthcoming 2013) (questioning Professor 
Garrett’s argument). 
 281 Any conception of constitutionally troubling levels of cost shifting implicitly de-
pends on a benchmark to gauge the permissible quantum of cost sharing the Constitu-
tion clearly permits. It is not plausible, after all, to say the federal government can im-
pose no costs on the states. Article I’s vesting of federal Taxing Power alone suffices to 
oust that possibility. Once this baseline question is recognized, it seems fair to wonder 
whether there is any meaningful way for courts to distinguish between “good” and “bad” 
cost sharing on either doctrinal or welfarist grounds. Moreover, this baseline problem 
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toggles between enumerated powers. There is no obvious corre-
lation, that is, between the use of a specific enumerated power 
and the likelihood of cost shifting (and certainly, the Court has 
identified no such linkage). Just as it is possible for a § 5 enact-
ment to impose compliance costs on the state,282 so too can a 
Commerce Clause enactment directly regulate the states,283 oust 
the states from revenue-raising possibilities,284 or displace state 
regulatory schemes.285 Equally, a Taxing Power enactment 
might crowd out state revenues in ways that impose marginal 
costs of a magnitude similar to that associated with direct regu-
lation. Even a federal expenditure directed toward the states 
with conditions attached might either free up state funds or al-
ternatively tie them down by entangling the state in regulatory 
enterprises that would otherwise be foregone. Indeed, the size of 
any relevant externalities would seem to turn not so much on 
the specific enumerated power at issue, but rather on the par-
ticular design of a given regulatory intervention.  
Further, any correlation between the federal legislative 
choice of enumerated power and the magnitude of cost shifting 
to the states may be drowned out or complicated by other fiscal 
distortions inherent in the national legislative process. For ex-
ample, the relatively greater representation of small states as 
opposed to large states in the Senate may systematically yield 
transfers from the latter to the former.286 Given this potentially 
                                                                                                             
means that there is no obvious or simple litmus test for discerning when a measure im-
poses impermissible externalities on the states, as opposed to being justified by the crea-
tion of countervailing public goods at the federal level.  
 282 See, for example, Kimel, 528 US at 82–83 (emphasizing the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1976’s regulatory burdens on states and local governments). 
 283 See, for example, Garcia, 469 US at 533 (allowing application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to the states). 
 284 See Brian Galle, The Politics of Federalism: Self-Interest or Safeguards? Evidence 
from Congressional Control of State Taxation *12 (Boston College Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper No 220, Aug 20, 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759510 (visited Nov 29, 2012) (finding that congressional ac-
tion tends to reduce state taxing authority and that “this effect is more pronounced 
where there is tax-base competition and where public choice theory predicts”). Professor 
Brian Galle’s empirical findings also suggest that commandeering and Commerce Clause 
regulation can be equally effective in shifting costs to the states.  
 285 A shift in regulatory authority can in principle “be beneficial . . . . [w]hen initiat-
ed by public demand, authority migration demonstrates government responsiveness.” 
Jenna Bednar, Authority Migration in Federations: A Framework for Analysis, 37 PS: 
Polit Sci & Polit 403, 403 (2004). 
 286 See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the 
Spending Power, 103 Nw U L Rev 495, 535–36 (2009) (assembling empirical evidence to that 
effect); Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, 
 2013] Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence 639 

substantial background fiscal distortion, which flows from the 
malapportionment of national representation rather than from 
any kind of collective action problem, the choice of enumerated 
power may be inconsequential. Malapportionment at the na-
tional level may also make it difficult to ascertain ex ante 
whether a judicial intervention will bring cost sharing closer to 
or further away from a desirable baseline, such as one defined in 
per capita terms. Any judicial intervention may be either damp-
ening or exacerbating distortions created by the Senate’s appor-
tionment rule.287 In short, there is no reason to think Congress’s 
choice of an enumerated power conveys any information about 
the risk of cost shifting. 
More generally, federalism arguments from cost shifting 
rest on a nirvana fallacy.288 Such claims implicitly assume that 
states and localities are the only constituencies to which costs 
can be shifted.289 They ignore the possibility that states may be 
advantaged in the political process in comparison to other inter-
est groups, and hence secure cost shifting via federal legislation 
onto those interest groups. For example, consider the possibility 
that weak federal environmental regulation is in effect a trans-
fer of costs from the several states (which lose revenues from pol-
luting businesses) to future generations (unrepresented in Con-
gress).290 Or the possibility that weak federal antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                             
and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 Georgetown L J 173, 189–90 (2011) 
(documenting the Senate’s deviation from per capita representation). 
 287 Lynn A. Baker, Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 Ga St U L Rev 923, 
943–45 (1997) (arguing that because the Court in several cases, including Dole, has been 
unwilling to enforce constitutional provisions meant to give power to the states, it has 
implicitly endorsed the “systematic redistribution from large population states to small 
ones” effected by the national structure of representation). 
 288 See Maxwell L. Stearns and Todd J. Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts and Appli-
cations in Law 112 (West 2009) (“Scholars commit the nirvana fallacy when they identify 
a defect in a given institution and then, based upon the perceived defect, propose fixing 
the problem by shifting decisional responsibility somewhere else.”). 
 289 See Roin, 93 Nw U L Rev at 376 (cited in note 279) (“The case against unfunded 
mandates relies either on the presence of unsophisticated voters or on a systematic pattern 
of weaker interest groups at the local cost-bearing level than at the federal benefit-enjoying 
level.”). This parallels the problem in the individual rights context of figuring out “how 
we are supposed to distinguish [ ] ‘prejudice’ from principled, if ‘wrong,’ disapproval. 
Which groups are to count as ‘discrete and insular minorities’? Which are instead to be 
deemed appropriate losers . . . ?” Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L J 1063, 1073 (1980). 
 290 For evidence that at least some environmental regulations can transfer costs be-
tween populations, see David Satterthwaite, The Links between Poverty and the Envi-
ronment in Urban Areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 590 Annals Am Acad Polit & 
Soc Sci 73, 90 (2003); Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and 
Future Generations, 2003 U Ill L Rev 289, 290. 
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legislation (at least in the absence of a state-law complement) 
enables uncompensated transfers between states and a diffuse 
group of employees who are poorly represented in the political 
process.291 That is, a claim that an unfunded mandate is norma-
tively troubling requires a comparison of states’ influence in 
Congress with the influence of whatever other group stands to 
gain from the states’ loss (or vice versa).  
Once other interest groups are introduced into the analysis 
in this fashion, it becomes difficult to predict whether or when 
an enumerated power engenders an unacceptable risk of cost 
shifting to the states. The resulting analysis of congressional 
cost shifting must therefore proceed on a retail, not a wholesale, 
basis, since there is no longer a simple correlation between Con-
gress’s choice of enumerated power and the states’ exposure to 
unfunded mandates.292 
Second, an alternative account of political process failure 
that might justify tiers of scrutiny for enumerated powers would 
draw upon public choice theory. This application of economic 
modeling to legislative bargaining models the production of 
statutes as a market in which interest groups bid for congres-
sional attention.293 Comparative advantage accrues to groups 
with relatively low collective action costs, for example, because 
they are not geographically dispersed or have homogenous in-
terests.294 Legislation will, on this view, reflect “the (politically 
 
 291 Consider, for example, the case of those with disabilities. It would be expected 
that the disability lobby be weak because it is diffuse and because many potential mem-
bers do not know they are members until they are disabled (that is, after the moment for 
lobbying has come and gone). As such, there is a timing problem in effective collective 
action. See John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legis-
lation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U Pa L Rev 523, 524–28 (1987). 
 292 A further wrinkle is that arguments from cost shifting must account for mecha-
nisms such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Pub L No 104-4, 109 
Stat 48, codified at amended at 2 USC § 602 et seq. UMRA’s “very passage indicates the 
influence retained by state and local governments over the federal legislature.” Roin, 93 
Nw U L Rev at 379 n 109 (cited in note 279). Because UMRA’s coverage is not perceived 
as comprehensive, any baseline to test when a particular instance of cost shifting should 
raise constitutional flags must account for the Act’s strengths and weaknesses. See Gar-
rett, 45 U Kan L Rev at 1168–69 (cited in note 272). 
 293 See Stearns and Zywicki, Public Choice at 49–53 (cited in note 288) (summariz-
ing the economic theory of regulation). 
 294 See James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations 332–37 (Basic Books 1973) (identi-
fying distributions of costs and benefits as key determinants of interest-group mobiliza-
tion). See also Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups 33–36 (Harvard 1965) (explaining why an analysis of political influence should 
focus on collective action costs). James Wilson and Mancur Olson likely underestimate 
the ability of diffuse beneficiaries to elicit legislative action through politicians’ rational 
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responsive) interests located within [a given] district.”295 Draw-
ing on public choice theory, it might be argued that the enumer-
ated powers should be organized into tiers of scrutiny depending 
on the risk that states will be outmatched in the federal legisla-
tive process by better-placed interest groups.296 
The objection to this argument roughly parallels the counter 
developed above to the cost-shifting argument. Once more, there 
is no obvious correlation between Congress’s choice of enumerat-
ed power and the putative vulnerability of states in the federal 
legislative process. The degree of states’ influence on a law’s 
drafting is not in any simple way a function of which enumerat-
ed power is in play. Rather, it is an empirical question how 
much weight states’ views have, one with an answer that likely 
will vary on a bill-by-bill basis. Some exemplary case studies, 
though, throw light on the question. 
Consider first the 2010 healthcare legislation, which was 
the object of intense private lobbying. Notwithstanding the 
powerful interest groups at work, and despite the federalism 
anxieties that have come to wreathe the law, studies of the stat-
ute’s enactment process have found that state officials in fact 
“did wield influence during the congressional process in several 
notable respects” and secured meaningful changes to the law.297 
This influence did not appear to turn, however, on the unre-
solved question whether Congress was relying on its Commerce 
Clause or Spending Power authority. It turned on factors entire-
ly extraneous to the Constitution.  
Much the same can be said of the civil damages provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,298 which was invali-
dated on federalism-inspired grounds in 2000.299 That measure, 
which was enacted pursuant to both the Commerce Clause and 
                                                                                                             
expectation of “future opinion” and consequent electoral punishment. R. Douglas Arnold, 
The Logic of Congressional Action 9–10 (Yale 1990).  
 295 Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Con-
gress; Or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J Polit Econ 
132, 136 (1988).  
 296 See, for example, Devins, 50 Duke L J at 1194–1200 (cited in note 17) (doubting 
whether the political economy of the federal legislative process conduces to serious con-
sideration of state concerns). See also Roderick M. Hills Jr, Against Preemption: How 
Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 NYU L Rev 1, 33–34 (2007) 
(analyzing the interest-group competition in Congress relevant to federalism outcomes).  
 297 John Dinan, Shaping Health Reform: State Government Influence in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 41 Publius 395, 407 (2011). 
 298 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, title IV, Pub L No 103-
322, 108 Stat 1796, 1902–55. 
 299 Morrison, 529 US at 625–27. 
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the Reconstruction Amendments, had the support of thirty-eight 
states’ attorneys general—hardly evidence of a federalism cri-
sis.300 Those states sided with the people for whose benefit the 
Reconstruction Amendments were first enacted, rather than 
with any abstract idea of states’ rights. 
At the same time, it is also easy to conjure instances in 
which states—as the objects of regulation—oppose enactments 
pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments.301 States, in other 
words, can both oppose and support measures that seemingly 
narrow their federalism-related interests under § 5. There is no 
clear connection between patterns of state mobilization in sup-
port of or against federal laws on the one hand and the choice of 
enumerated power on the other. But if there is no clear correla-
tion between Congress’s choice of enumerated power and the pub-
lic choice dynamics of a law’s enactment, it is hard to see how 
those dynamics can underwrite tiers of scrutiny for enumerat-
ed powers.302 
An alternative version of the public choice objection might 
be invoked to animate the clear statement rule employed in the 
Spending Power context.303 That rule might be justified by the 
hypothesis that the constitutionally mandated process of bicam-
eralism and presentment is more likely to yield laws that re-
spect states’ interests than extratextual, penumbral glosses 
placed on those enactments by executive agencies or federal 
judges.304  
 
 300 See Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 1729 (cited in note 17). 
 301 For an obvious example of a statute that has garnered consistent opposition from 
states, see Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat at 4437; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, Pub L No 91-285, 84 Stat 314; Voting Rights Act of 1965 Amendments of 1975, Pub L 
No 94-73, 89 Stat 400; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub L No 97-295, 96 Stat 
131; Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthori-
zation and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-246, 120 Stat 577, codified at 42 USC 
§§ 1973–1973aa-6. For an account of state opposition, see Chandler Davidson, The Voting 
Rights Act: A Brief History, in Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds, Controver-
sies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 7, 19, 39 (Brookings 1992). 
 302 Moreover, state officials influence the federal legislative agenda prior to the se-
lection of an enumerated power. Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism at 63–64 table 4 (cit-
ed in note 272) (listing examples of agenda-setting influence). Hence, states influence 
federal lawmaking before anyone has decided which enumerated power is in play. 
 303 See, for example, Sossamon v Texas, 131 S Ct 1651, 1661 (2011). 
 304 See Virginia Department of Education v Riley, 106 F3d 559, 567 (4th Cir 1997) 
(en banc) (“[T]o give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional am-
biguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia relied to protect 
states’ interests.”) (alteration in original), quoting Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 464 
(1991), quoting Laurence Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 6-25 at 480 (Founda-
tion 2d ed 1988). For academic development of this idea, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation 
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Even this more limited defense of the use of a clear state-
ment rule, however, is vulnerable. A number of scholars have 
recently developed arguments for the empirical claim that fed-
eral agencies tend to be more solicitous of state interests than 
legislators in the course of the Article I, § 7 legislative process.305 
These scholars assert that the presumption on which an anti-
preemption clear statement rule rests—that the Congress is a 
better venue for the vindication of states’ interests than the ad-
ministrative process—is flawed.306 If they are correct, the Court’s 
clear statement rule in the Spending Power context shifts deci-
sional authority from an entity likely to strike effectively a bal-
ance between competing policy and constitutional interests to a 
legislative process that is systematically prone to producing 
ambiguity and even conflicting instructions.307 On that view, a 
clear statement rule in respect to conditional spending enact-
ments is unwarranted, and even perverse, in the absence of a 
more robust empirical defense of Congress’s institutional compe-
tence on federalism values. 
Beyond these objections, any justification for variegated ju-
dicial review of enumerated powers based on public choice 
grounds must account for the relative influence of interest 
groups not only within the legislative process but also in the ju-
dicial process.308  
                                                                                                             
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex L Rev 1321, 1325 (2001) (arguing that 
“strict adherence to federal lawmaking procedures” protects federalism values better than 
judicial enforcement). For a critique of Professor Bradford Clark’s position, see Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum L Rev 731, 780–81 (2010). 
 305 See, for example, Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-
Forcing” Measures, 58 Duke L J 2125, 2150–52 (2009) (documenting how agencies were 
more responsive to state regulatory concerns around the REAL ID Act of 2005 than Con-
gress). See also Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L J 1933, 
1939, 1948–83 (2008) (arguing that “for the most part, agencies outperform” other feder-
al branches as allocators of policy setting power); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and 
Preemption, 102 Mich L Rev 737, 741 (2004). 
 306 See, for example, Mendelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 741 (cited in note 305). 
 307 For an account of why congressional delegation to agencies will be pervasive, see 
David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Approach 
to Policy Making under Separate Powers 196–97 (Cambridge 1999) (modeling causes of 
statutory delegations). See also Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robin-
son, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L Rev 1, 55–60 (1982) (arguing that 
Congress engages in responsibility-shifting delegations so as to avoid blame for bad out-
comes while claiming credit for good outcomes).  
 308 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judi-
cial Review?, 101 Yale L J 31, 66–68 (1991) (“Interest group theory can justify more in-
trusive judicial review only if it shows that the litigation process has some comparative 
advantage over the political process.”). 
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The use of heightened scrutiny in some domains of federal 
regulatory power but not others assumes that (1) courts can 
identify those instances in which states are especially vulnera-
ble to competing interest groups and (2) the litigation process 
will respond to such legislative pathologies without itself being 
distorted by the same or even additional lobbying effects. Yet it 
is hardly clear why we should assume that federal courts, but 
not Congress, are free of interest-group influence. Selective judi-
cial scrutiny in some policy domains may reflect the success of 
some interest groups’ efforts at attaining a deregulatory agenda 
through the promotion of certain judicial appointments.309 Alter-
natively, an interest group that prevails against the states in 
the federal legislative process is also likely to be influential in 
the states’ own governmental processes.310 If that is so, it would 
be reasonable to expect states not to pursue litigation precisely in 
those instances in which public choice theory would suggest that 
it is most valuable. In either case, it is hard to see why judicial 
review can be mechanically promoted as a panacea for public 
choice dysfunctions in the federal legislative process.  
One final point is worth making. If indeed relevant to an as-
sessment of the appropriate scope of post hoc intervention by 
federal judges, the public choice analysis of interest-group dy-
namics arguably cuts against any robust judicial review on fed-
eralism grounds. States, after all, have an “intergovernmental 
lobby” that influences federal legislation even beyond big-ticket 
items such as the healthcare law.311 They suffer from few of the 
deliberative and epistemic shortfalls that bedevil other interest 
groups.312 And they have become increasingly coordinated and 
 
 309 See, for example, id at 81–83. Consider Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and 
Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J L & Polit 645, 654 
(1999) (noting that an interest group with a policy agenda such as deregulation could 
contribute to the campaigns of judges who are responsive to their political view). 
 310 See, for example, Tyler Welti, Massachusetts v. EPA’s Regulatory Interest Theo-
ry: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 Va L Rev 1751, 1782 (2008) (not-
ing that state attorneys general are at risk of being captured by special interest groups). 
 311 See Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism at 31, 118–20 (cited in note 272). 
 312 For an argument that it is irrational for individual voters to gather information 
to enable informed voting, see Bryan Caplan, Rational Irrationality and the Microfoun-
dations of Political Failure, 107 Pub Choice 311, 311–20 (2001). For an argument that 
states are better equipped than interest groups to gather information relevant to the 
federal legislative process, see Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of Fed-
eralism’s Political Safeguards, 119 Harv L Rev 609, 621–22 (2005). 
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effective participants in the federal litigation process, in particu-
lar at the Supreme Court.313  
All this suggests the Court’s tendency to view noneconomic 
legislation with a more skeptical eye than economic legislation is 
a mistake. If the states comprise, in general, an effective lobby, 
then we would expect them to prevail except in the cases in 
which they face a more powerful foe—such as the well-organized 
business community. (As is well known, empirical studies of 
Congress find a skew toward business groups and against those 
representing the less advantaged.314) This suggests that the 
states will prevail in Congress in noneconomic matters, but 
remain vulnerable on economic matters.  
Hence, when the Court assumes there is a “‘disability lobby’ 
. . . [that] rolled over the defenseless states as employers” during 
enactment of the ADA,315 it is taking a view of the political pro-
cess that is quite likely false. In that case, the Court’s height-
ened skepticism of social legislation may operate paradoxically 
to deepen extant political and social inequalities by privileging 
states as against the least well-organized and most vulnerable 
interest groups, while leaving them undefended against power-
ful private interests. It is hard to see why this is desirable. 
There is, in short, no good way of reasoning from a political 
process account of federalism to a system of tiered review. To the 
extent studies of the political process teach anything, they coun-
sel against the presently observed system of tiered judicial re-
view of Congress’s enumerated powers. 
 
 313 For empirical evidence, see Paul M. Collins Jr, Friends of the Supreme Court: 
Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making 73–74 table 3.6 (Oxford 2008) (document-
ing the increase in states’ amicus briefs filed between 1950 and 1995); Eric N. Walten-
burg and Bill Swinford, Litigating Federalism: The States before the U.S. Supreme Court 
60–61 table 5.1 (Greenwood 1999). 
 314 See Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady, The Unheaven-
ly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy 19–
20, 265–446 (Princeton 2012) (documenting comprehensively the power of wealth and 
business lobbies); Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and 
American Democracy 65–73 (Harper & Row 1986). See also Larry M. Bartels, Unequal 
Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age 285 (Russell Sage 2008) 
(“[A]ffluent people have considerable clout [in the federal legislative process], while the 
preferences of people in the bottom third of the income distribution have no apparent 
impact on the behavior of their elected officials.”); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, 
Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back 
on the Middle Class 41–72 (Simon & Schuster 2010). This effect is likely exacerbated by 
recent changes to First Amendment rules pertaining to campaign finance law. See Citi-
zens United v FEC, 130 S Ct 876, 917 (2010). 
 315 Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale L J at 1729 (cited in note 17). 
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D. Variations in the “Goods” of Federalism 
The next argument to consider is a variant on the federal-
ism-based argument for tiers of scrutiny in enumerated powers 
jurisprudence: Even if there is no predictable pattern of political 
process failure, there are still differences in the underlying 
goods or values that our system of federalism promotes. Because 
each enumerated power implicates a different bundle of those 
goods, there may be a need for differently calibrated review be-
tween various powers. Again, this argument on close inspection 
turns out to be frangible. And again, the core problem is the ab-
sence of any obvious correlation among enumerated powers and 
the potential for harm to federalism values. Case-by-case analy-
sis is instead necessary to gauge how much of a concern any giv-
en federal enactment likely raises. 
Federalism comprises plural strands.316 Even within the 
Court’s jurisprudence, we can identify distinct concerns about 
preserving separate spheres of state regulatory autonomy,317 en-
suring states’ financial robustness,318 and respecting the inde-
pendent operation of state political institutions.319 The incidence 
 
 316 See Fallon, 69 U Chi L Rev at 439–40 (cited in note 40). See also Heather K. 
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 Wm & Mary L Rev 1549, 1552 (2012) (“Federalism theory 
has long exhibited a healthy pluralism with regard to the ends federalism promotes.”). 
As Professor Alison LaCroix’s incisive account of the “ideological origins” of federalism 
demonstrates, “the specific consequences of federal thought shifted over the decades be-
tween the 1760s and the 1800s,” in part as the Framers turned from problems of legislative 
authority to jurisdiction. LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 7–9, 217–19 (cited in note 51).  
 317 See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 7 (cited in note 51) (noting the Founding-era 
“belief that the division of authority among levels of government should be determined 
according to the subject matter at issue”). See also Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft 
Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 Duke L J 1513, 1527 (2002) (“For generations the 
Court had conceived the constitutional values of federalism as served by the mainte-
nance of separate and incompatible spheres of state and federal authority.”). A concern 
with separate spheres has long been eulogized as outdated. See Roderick M. Hills Jr, The 
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and 
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich L Rev 813, 815 (1998); Edward S. Corwin, The Pass-
ing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va L Rev 1, 19 (1950). But it continues to reemerge in the 
case law. See, for example, Lopez, 514 US at 577 (Kennedy concurring) (“Were the Fed-
eral Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, 
areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries 
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility 
would become illusory.”). 
 318 See Fallon, 69 U Chi L Rev at 445 (cited in note 40) (noting the role of fiscal con-
cerns in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence). 
 319 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 Harv L Rev 2180, 2218 (1998) (arguing for “the value of states as alterna-
tive locations of independently derived government power”). Alternatively, it is possible 
to explain federalism in terms of the expected welfare benefits from plural sovereigns 
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of these distinct goods is unlikely to be perfectly correlated. It 
may also be that different enumerated powers impinge on these 
regulatory, fiscal, and political goods in different and distinct 
ways, such that the Court is right to apply a discontinuous form 
of constitutional scrutiny. 
The Court, however, has never explained why it is that 
some enumerated powers pose more of a risk to the aforemen-
tioned federalism values than others. And—echoing a point de-
veloped earlier—it is not at all clear that there is a strong corre-
lation between the choice of enumerated power and the threat to 
regulatory, fiscal, or political federalism values. Worse, the in-
teraction between a given enumerated power and any one of 
these values may be so entangled, subtle, and unpredictable 
that federal judges will be prone to miss them.  
Consider an example of the Court’s failure to grasp how fed-
eral laws can threaten the federalism-related value of state po-
litical autonomy—Steward Machine Co v Davis,320 which upheld 
unemployment compensation portions of the Social Security 
Act321 (SSA) under the Taxing Power.322 The SSA imposed a tax 
on employers but granted those same employers a credit for 
payments to state unemployment insurance schemes.323 The 
Court rejected the argument that the SSA was “void as involving 
the coercion of the states.”324 In so doing, it missed the SSA’s ef-
fect on the states’ democratic processes. The law’s intended and 
actual effect was to alter the expressed preferences of a key con-
stituency in state elections (large business owners) that would 
otherwise oppose state politicians who proposed unemployment 
schemes.325 Rather than directly changing the state’s regulatory 
policy, that is, the SSA indirectly influenced it by tinkering with 
the states’ democratic political processes.326 Such sidelong ma-
nipulation of states’ political processes might be thought to raise 
                                                                                                             
with some degree of autonomy. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 1484, 1493–1511 (1987) (focusing on the positive goods 
generated through maintenance of a federal system, rather than cataloguing the design 
predicates of federalism). 
 320 301 US 548 (1937). 
 321 Pub L No 74-271, ch 531, 49 Stat 620 (1935), codified as amended at 42 USC 
§ 301 et seq. 
 322 Steward Machine, 301 US at 582 (upholding the SSA). 
 323 Id at 575. 
 324 Id at 585, 590. 
 325 See John Brueggemann, Racial Considerations and Social Policy in the 1930s: 
Economic Change and Political Opportunities, 26 Soc Sci Hist 139, 163–66 (2002). 
 326 See id. 
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federalism flags—and yet it did not even register in the Court’s 
analysis.327  
In addition to showing how courts can miss the subtle and 
complex relationships between Congress’s choice of enumerated 
powers and federalism’s diverse goods, Steward Machine 
demonstrates that even the otherwise innocuous Taxing Power 
can be used to undermine the autonomous operation of state po-
litical processes. Again, the larger point is that the magnitude 
of any correlation between the invocation of a particular enu-
merated power and threats to federalism goods is hard to pre-
dict ex ante. 
Accounts of federalism’s underlying values are, accordingly, 
insufficiently theorized to warrant reliable predictions about 
which enumerated powers should provoke concern. As a result, 
any recalibration of the strength of judicial review on federalism 
grounds should proceed on a case-by-case basis. Acting in such a 
granular basis, courts benefit from the briefing offered by par-
ties and any error is of limited consequence.  
E. The Distinctive Judicial Concern with Individual Rights 
Another reason to attend to the distinctive ends that Con-
gress can pursue with its enumerated powers might conduce to 
the creation and utility of tiers of scrutiny turns not on internal 
variation in federalism ends, but on a distinction between rights 
and structure. That is, we might posit that courts should engage 
in closer judicial scrutiny in respect to rights-related congres-
sional powers than in respect to structural principles such as 
federalism. This distinction would trade on language in judicial 
opinions as early as Marbury v Madison328 to the effect that 
“[t]he province of the courts is, solely, to decide on the rights of 
individuals,”329 since “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”330 It follows that feder-
al courts have a special obligation “to protect the constitutional 
 
 327 Indeed, the SSA arguably raised especially substantial federalism concerns be-
cause the subtlety of its operative mechanism arguably made it more difficult for voters 
to allocate responsibility accurately between different levels of government. The Court 
has styled this as a concern about “accountability.” Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 
929–30 (1997); New York v United States, 505 US 144, 168 (1992). 
 328 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 329 Id at 170.  
 330 Id at 163. See also Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 208 (1962). 
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rights of individuals from legislative destruction.”331 Hence, they 
must attend with special care to how Congress employs its 
rights-related powers, such as the Reconstruction Amendments 
and (perhaps) the Intellectual Property Clause. 
Yet a rights/structure distinction—even assuming it is ana-
lytically coherent332—supplies no plausible basis for sorting 
enumerated powers into different tiers of judicial review. To 
begin with, the distinction does not explain why the Court cur-
rently employs greater scrutiny when examining rights-
protective legislation enacted under § 5 than when examining 
Commerce Clause enactments. To the contrary, the Court’s pre-
sent approach seems precisely backward. Moreover, the distinc-
tion does not explain why the Court dons the actuary’s green 
eyeshade when Congress seeks to legislate prophylactically and 
yet remains silent when Congress fails to protect a right, say by 
failing to invoke Commerce Clause authority to enact a precau-
tionary rule.333  
More generally, there is no particular reason to believe that 
Congress’s election of a particular enumerated power supplies a 
reliable guide as to whether an ensuing statute either promotes 
or undermines liberty interests. History suggests, to the contra-
ry, that each enumerated power is equally capable of promoting 
or debilitating one or another species of liberty. On the one 
hand, a Commerce Clause enactment, as much as a Spending 
Power enactment, might imperil a liberty interest against exces-
sive governmental regulation.334 On the other hand, Congress 
has historically employed the Commerce Clause power to promote 
 
 331 Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1, 6–7 (1964).  
 332 The analytical coherence of a rights/structure distinction is hardly obvious. The 
Framers believed rights and structure had overlapping goals. See, for example, Federal-
ist 47 (Madison), in The Federalist 323, 323–25 (cited in note 24) (exploring the relation-
ship between “the structure of the federal government” and “liberty”); Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1132–33, 1153–54 (1991) (argu-
ing the individual entitlements in the Bill of Rights are “tightly interconnected” with the 
structural design of the Constitution). In my view, this is not a sufficient response to the 
distinction proposed here. Rights and structure may have convergent goals, but they 
promote such goals through quite different methods. See Huq, 98 Va L Rev at 1067–69 
(cited in note 20). It may well be that rights- and structure-based strategies for preserv-
ing liberties would benefit in divergent ways from differentially geared judicial review.  
 333 See Levinson, 99 Colum L Rev at 919 (cited in note 262) (“[M]erely limiting Con-
gress to remedies will not prevent it from eviscerating rights.”). 
 334 Consider in this regard the fierce contestation about the relationship between 
the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate and individual liberty. See, for example, 
Noa Ben-Asher, Obligatory Health, 15 Yale Hum Rts & Dev L J 1, 7–8 (2012) (identify-
ing the individual mandate as an “impingement on individual liberty”). 
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civil rights just as effectively as it has wielded the Reconstruc-
tion Amendment.335 These examples suggest that the Constitu-
tion is plausibly understood to promote plural forms of liberty 
(here, economic freedom and freedom from discrimination), and 
that conflicts between those different species of liberty are pos-
sible. Further, both the Commerce Clause and the Spending 
Power can be employed to tip the scales in favor of either one or 
the other kind of liberty, or, instead, to enact federal laws that 
trench on both. 
In short, even if the Court wished to hew to Marbury’s hor-
tatory peroration to individual rights, this would not justify 
placing the enumerated powers on different tiers of scrutiny for 
purposes of judicial review. Rather, it would point the Court to-
ward a sorting of laws on a case-by-case basis depending upon the 
threat they in fact present to some especially valued liberty.336 
F. Standards of Review as Complements to Substantive 
Doctrinal Change 
The final argument in favor of varying standards of review 
focuses on the interaction between substantive law on the one 
hand and standards of review on the other. Its gist is that 
standards of review should vary in ways that mirror, and thus 
compensate for, changes in the ease or difficulty of engaging in 
judicial review of a particular substantive standard.337 Rather 
than complementing the political safeguards of federalism as 
previously suggested, shifting standards of review would com-
pensate for variation in the ease or difficulty of law declaration. 
There are (roughly speaking) two ways in which a court can 
expand federal legislative authority. It can either ratchet up the 
deference to Congress’s legal judgment about the scope of a giv-
en enumerated power or evince greater deference to Congress’s 
 
 335 Hence, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 
241, under the Commerce Clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v United States, 379 
US 241, 245 (1964). 
 336 I develop further the argument that structural constitutional choices have only a 
weak correlation to trends in individual liberty elsewhere, extending it to federalism 
claims more generally and also to the separation of powers. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, 
Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 Va L Rev (forthcoming 2013). 
 337 My argument here is distinct from Professor Heather Gerken’s point that “it is 
possible for many forms of federalism to coexist” as “complements and not just substi-
tutes.” Gerken, 53 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1564 (cited in note 316). The argument here re-
lies on a notion of equilibrated enforcement, whereas Professor Gerken’s is a free-form 
celebration of diverse technologies of federalism without any attempt to establish a base-
line of desirable enforcement levels. 
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empirical judgments about the nexus between a law and an 
enumerated power. Either strategy can yield to Congress more 
breathing room for regulation. In consequence, both species of 
deference are rough substitutes for each other. The ensuing plu-
rality of doctrinal tools might be valuable to a Court that wishes 
to ensure Congress is subject to a constant level of judicial scru-
tiny and constraint, but finds it difficult to impose the same de-
gree of constraint on Congress through the delineation of sub-
stantive rules.  
The goal of equal constraint across the enumerated powers 
might be warranted on the ground that while legislators typical-
ly operate within constitutional bounds, they are consistently 
tempted to stray outside those bounds.338 If incentives to act ul-
tra vires are distributed evenly across the enumerated powers, 
then the Court must apply a constant quantum of resistance 
against legislative overreaching. Judges’ ability to draw precise 
legal boundaries, however, might vary between the enumerated 
powers. For example, it might simply be easier to limn tractable 
doctrinal boundaries for the Commerce Clause than to write 
down a workable test for coercion under the Taxing Power. Or 
the fashioning of § 5 doctrine might be easier than the delineation 
of an across-the-board rule for conditional spending enactments. 
To buffer its intermittent inability to reel in Congress 
through tightening substantive boundaries of an enumerated 
power, the Court might turn to the standard of review and 
ratchet up its scrutiny of the legislature’s empirical judgment. 
By toggling between deference to legislative judgments of law 
and of fact, legislators’ feet would be held to the fire equally re-
gardless of the enumerated power they chose to invoke. In that 
way, the Court might maintain what Justice Anthony Kennedy 
calls “the federal balance”339 uniformly across the diverse enu-
merated powers. 
At present, however, it is not the case that the Court treats 
deference to Congress’s legal and factual judgments as substi-
tutes. As a result of this want of fungibility, the aggregate level 
of judicial scrutiny of Congress’s legal and factual judgments 
 
 338 For an argument that legislators are consistently tempted to stray outside con-
stitutional bounds, see Lynn A. Baker and Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double 
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L J 75, 115–18 (2001) (criticizing the possibility of 
political promotion of federalism values). 
 339 Lopez, 514 US at 578 (Kennedy concurring). I bracket here the ample reasons for 
skepticism of the “balance” metaphor in a context implicating incommensurate values, 
bundled governmental goods, and fluid exogenous pressures.  
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varies widely across enumerated powers. On intellectual proper-
ty questions, for example, Congress appears to secure large def-
erence on both counts. On questions arising under the Recon-
struction Amendments, the federal legislature obtains no benefit 
of the doubt on either score.340  
More generally, there is simply not enough variation in the 
scope of judicial deference to Congress’s legal judgments to ex-
plain modulation in judicial supervision of factual judgments. 
With the exception of the Intellectual Property Clause, the 
Court has “largely refused to defer on questions of constitutional 
interpretation.”341 This means there is simply not enough varia-
tion in deference to congressional legal interpretations to justify 
differential gearing in the standards of factual review. 
Further, the complementarity of law definition and stand-
ards of review is not as clear as might first appear. Consider, for 
example, the Commerce Clause, where the Court has furnished 
a reasonably precise tripartite doctrinal definition of legislative 
authority.342 Yet at least with respect to the first two elements of 
the doctrinal test, legal clarity coexists with considerable legisla-
tive discretion. Law declaration, that is, may or may not yield 
constraints on Congress depending on how tightly the doctrinal 
lines are drawn. In consequence, arguments for tiered judicial re-
view based on a balancing of legal and factual deference with the 
aim of securing a constant level of judicial deference must fail. 
G. Abandoning Tiers of Scrutiny for Enumerated Powers 
This Part has evaluated six possible justifications for the 
use of differential tiers of scrutiny in enumerated powers juris-
prudence. In each case, I have argued that the potential justifi-
cation fails to explain or justify the differentiation of judicial re-
view by enumerated power. Of course, I cannot demonstrate 
that there is not a seventh potential justification that will suc-
ceed. But I believe that it is fair to venture that the foregoing 
analysis has covered most of the likely grounds on which the ti-
ers of scrutiny might be justified. At minimum, I hope to have 
shifted the burden of persuasion onto those who approve of the 
Court’s current approach to enumerated powers jurisprudence, 
and who would retain tiers of scrutiny.  
 
 340 Compare City of Boerne, 521 US at 520–30, with Eldred, 537 US at 218–22. 
 341 Hessick, 85 Notre Dame L Rev at 1449 (cited in note 29). 
 342 Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 16–17 (2005). See also text accompanying note 78. 
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The more ambitious—but still, I hope, plausible—inference 
to be drawn from this analysis is that there is simply no sound 
justification for tiered review in enumerated powers jurispru-
dence. There is hence no reason to distinguish Reconstruction 
Amendment enactments from Commerce Clause enactments, no 
reason to separate those Commerce Clause enactments that con-
cern “noneconomic” interstate activities from those concerning 
“economic” interstate activities, and no reason to hive off spend-
ing and taxing from the general regime of judicial supervision. 
Moreover, recall that I endeavored to demonstrate in Part II 
that using tiers of scrutiny in enumerated powers jurisprudence 
is not simply unjustified but also leads to ample unwelcome con-
sequences. Tiered review creates pockets of discretion for unde-
sirable strategic behavior by judges and legislators. In conse-
quence, the outcomes of judicial review are less likely to be the 
products of principled reasoning and more likely to reflect specific 
individual judges’ policy preferences.343 Stratified judicial review 
of Congress’s enumerated powers is not only unwarranted but 
also positively undesirable. 
If that more ambitious version of my thesis is persuasive—
as I will assume for the balance of this Part—it points toward a 
need for reform of the existing doctrine. But what would that re-
form look like? My proposed reform involves a move to lockstep 
judicial review. This move would largely eliminate opportunities 
for strategic behavior by diminishing the space for judicially ini-
tiated changes to the scope of federal legislative authority and 
by forestalling the possibility of doctrinal arbitrage (either by 
Congress or the courts) across the enumerated powers.344 The re-
sult would be a more temporally stable, democratically respon-
sive, and principled jurisprudence. My aim in what follows is to 
flesh out that proposal. 
To reiterate first a caveat lodged initially in the Introduc-
tion, the reform proposed here would hardly end debate about 
the scope of federal power. To the contrary, my proposed aboli-
tion of tiers of scrutiny for enumerated powers is not intended to 
resolve in any way the underlying question of how broadly fed-
eral authority should sweep. That question is too complex, too 
fraught, and too entrenched to be resolved simply through so sub-
tle a shift in the mechanics of judicial review. In consequence, a 
 
 343 See text accompanying note 219. 
 344 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv L Rev 731, 737 
(1987) (arguing that transparent decision making constrains the exercise of judicial power). 
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court employing lockstep review can still side with either the 
federal government or the several states.  
The main difference from the status quo to follow from my 
proposal is methodological. The judiciary, on my view, should 
resolve the scope of congressional power with different tools 
than those presently employed. The proposed shift in working 
method would generate more transparency and reduce the risk 
of strategic action by judicial and political elites. The Court’s po-
sition on the federal-state balance would be more unequivocal 
and less prone to unprincipled caveats, hesitations, or excep-
tions. The winners from my proposed reform, I submit, would 
not necessarily be the several states or the federal government, 
but the democratic polity at large.345 
Eliminating tiers of scrutiny for enumerated powers would 
force the Court to confront directly and frankly that question 
and render the stakes of ensuing decisions more pellucid. In lieu 
of our current world of recondite doctrinal formations, hollow 
symbolic gestures, and “lawyers’ revolution[s],”346 the move to 
lockstep judicial review of the enumerated powers would push 
the Court to take seriously the enduring project of sculpting 
boundaries to Congress’s fulsome enumerated authorities.347 In 
this way, the proposed reform would render the political and pol-
icy stakes of such judicial review more transparent in ways that 
enable more meaningful public discussion. 
The lumpiness of judicial review would also mean that the 
Court could not single out specific, disfavored enumerated pow-
ers—consider in this regard its treatment of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Hence, the proposed reform would tend to pre-
clude the Court from drawing lines between favored and disfa-
vored legislation on grounds that have scant basis in the Consti-
tution. The ad hoc distinction between economic and 
noneconomic matters that haunts enumerated powers jurispru-
dence, for example, could consequently be happily retired.348 
 
 345 There is no question that under certain circumstances, opacity is a desirable char-
acteristic in governmental institutions. One might not want, for example, a Central Intelli-
gence Agency or a Federal Reserve whose every move was subject to external scrutiny or 
political lobbying. But I see no reason to demur to the goal of maximal transparency in re-
spect to the articulation of constitutional norms, which is the task at hand here. 
 346 Fallon, 69 U Chi L Rev at 494 (cited in note 40). 
 347 This is not to say that the task of law declaration excludes the possibility of sym-
bolic yet functionally nugatory judicial interventions. The activity/inactivity distinction 
in The Healthcare Cases might be one such ineffectual and symbolic gesture. See note 78. 
 348 See note 79 and accompanying text. 
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New avenues of judicial activism motivated by the policy pecca-
dillos of the justices would also go undiscovered. 
Under the proposed regime of lockstep judicial review, the 
Court, if it wished to reduce federal power, could certainly do so. 
But it would have to do so plainly, openly, and across-the-board. 
If indeed there is a new balance to be struck between the federal 
government and the states, the justices would have to announce 
it frankly, publicly, and without occluding subterfuge or camou-
flage. Eliminating discontinuous scrutiny in enumerated powers 
jurisprudence would hence yield gains denominated in judicial 
candor. Whether it would also diminish judicial power is harder 
to say. Certainly, it would diminish the space for certain less 
candid species of judicial action while leaving open other, more 
transparent modalities of intervention.  
All this is a long way from a solution to the problem of what 
substantive lines should circumscribe federal regulatory power. 
But at the very least it provides the groundwork for a more 
frank and openly democratic debate by “protecting the integrity 
of the public process by which legal justifications are developed, 
challenged, and modified over time.”349  
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers and law students laboring through the complex 
warren of federalism precedent often yearn for a purifying sim-
plicity to descend and burn away the doctrine’s rococo excres-
cences. As this Article has aimed to show, they are right to see 
the technical details of the jurisprudence, which I have lumped 
together as standard-of-review questions, as consequential. At 
the same time, they are also correct to muster animadversions 
against the case law based on the absence of cogent normative 
justifications for much of the observed doctrinal intricacy. The 
tiers-of-scrutiny system that has emerged in enumerated powers 
jurisprudence hence rests on fragile, even facile, ground. 
In the absence of tenable foundations for its enumerated 
powers jurisprudence, I have argued, the Court should jettison 
its use of discontinuous tiers of scrutiny and instead deploy a 
unitary standard of review for all of Congress’s enumerated 
powers. Doing so would remove the source of potentially corro-
sive arbitrariness and strategic behavior from the current ju-
risprudence. It would force the Court to confront directly the 
 
 349 Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va L Rev 987, 991 (2008).  
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question of how to calibrate the federal-state balance. No less 
importantly, it would require the justices to make clear their 
own responsibility for setting this balance—or, alternatively, 
their acquiescence in whatever equilibrium is set by the political 
process. Abandoning the tiers of scrutiny, in short, provides no 
easy answer to the core problem of American federalism. But it 
would inject a healthy transparency into judicial action and 
thereby open a more candid conversation about the role that the 
Court properly plays in crafting boundaries on federal regulato-
ry power in the twenty-first century. 
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